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The subject of the following essay belongs to a field of study and inves-
tigation that has been comparatively little cultivated in this country: the
analysis of the nature of legal conceptions without immediate or exclu-
sive reference to practical questions. Such analysis is apt to lose itself in
metaphysical speculations and refined distinctions of little substantial
value: it has therefore fallen into some measure of disrepute even in
Germany, where legal science and abstract jurisprudence were for a
long time almost convertible terms. It is certainly not necessary for prac-
tical purposes to carry every legal doctrine back to its ultimate founda-
tions in logic and psychology; but there is always some danger that an
error in fundamental conceptions may lead now and then to incorrect
practical conclusions, or—a less objectionable alternative—to unsound
reasoning in order to support a sound decision. An exhaustive analysis
of elementary legal ideas can therefore hardly fail to be of some practi-
cal value.
The question of the nature of corporate existence has a peculiar
interest and fascination. Few writers on the subject of corporations ig-
nore it altogether, and our courts have repeatedly enunciated their views
as to what a corporation really is. The result is that our law has its
accepted theory of corporate existence, while it can hardly be said to
have such a theory with regard to the nature of contract, obligation, or
incorporeal property. If we have an accepted theory, it is worth while to
examine it as to its truth.
The problem of corporate existence has a much wider than simply6/Ernst Freund
legal bearing. It has an even greater interest to the sociologist than to the
jurist. But I have confined myself to the corporation as a legal institu-
tion, ignoring the subject of association as a factor in economic, social,
and political life.
I have treated the subject analytically and not historically, because
my object was to establish an elementary conception, and not to ascer-
tain an existing legal doctrine. I have not even dealt with the question
how incorporation has come to be a conception of property law exclu-
sively, believing that the nature of corporate existence is not affected by
this historical limitation. The history of the corporate idea on the Conti-
nent of Europe has been most exhaustively treated by Professor Gierke
in his great work on Deutsches Genossenscheftsrecht; with regard to
the history of our law, we have valuable monographs, and a chapter in
Pollock and Maitland’s History gives an account of the conception of
the English law prior to the period of technical incorporation; but the
history of the law of corporations, like that of other parts of our law,
remains as yet unwritten.
There are other phases of the subject of corporations which might
seem to have called for examination in connection with this essay: above
all the difference between the several classes of corporations, public
and private, stock companies and societies for collective benefit, incor-
porated associations and incorporated trusts; also the nature and effect
of incorporation. I propose to treat these and cognate subjects sepa-
rately, and have omitted them here, because in my opinion the nature of
corporate existence can be demonstrated independently of them, and
because it seemed desirable to confine this essay to its primary subject,
which is sufficiently abstract and difficult to claim undivided attention.
E. F.
The University of Chicago
November, 1896
I. Statement of the Problem
§1. The Term “Corporation.”—The recognition of rights belonging
to groups of persons in common is probably as old as the conception of
any legal right, for different forms of community property occur in very
early stages of civilization. When legal theories begin to be formulated,
the instinctive feeling that such rights do not belong to the members of
the groups as their individual rights do, finds expression in the recogni-
tion of groups of persons as distinctive holders of rights and especiallyThe Legal Nature of the Corporations/7
of property rights. The common law designates such a group as a cor-
poration or body corporate. The term dates from about the beginning of
the fifteenth century; in 1411 we find the townsmen of Plymouth peti-
tioning that they may be a “corps corporat.”1 Prior to that time the
English law had no one comprehensive technical term to cover the vari-
ous ecclesiastical and lay bodies, chapters and colleges, cities and bor-
oughs, guilds and fraternities, which enjoyed common rights. The word
“communa” or “communitas” came nearest expressing the collective
conception and capacity of an aggregate body, but it appears to have
been applied chiefly to municipalities and guilds.2 The Roman jurists
and the Medieval civilians and canonists spoke of corpus, collegium, or
universitas. To the present German law the term corporation is familiar.
The French codes and statutes have no term corresponding to our “cor-
poration,” to express the distinctive capacity of municipalities (com-
munes); stock companies (sociétés anonymes), and public institutions
(établissements publics). The word corporation is foreign to the techni-
cal language of French jurisprudence as well as of legislation, except as
an equivalent for professional guild or association.3
§2. The “Juristic Person.”—The Germans emphasize the distinc-
tiveness of the corporation by calling it a legal or juristic person
(juristische Person). The French jurists use the analogous term “perso-
nae morale,” and similar expressions are sometimes met with in English
and American jurisprudence. The Germans distinguish different kinds
of juristic persons: associations (corporations in the narrower sense),
funds or endowments legally secured to certain purposes (Stifungen),
the state as a holder of property (Fiskus), and the estate of a decedent
before it becomes vested in the heir (hereditas jacens). This may appear
to extend the conception of juristic personality somewhat beyond that of
the corporate holding of rights. But if we except as of little importance
the hereditas jacens, an idea of the Roman jurists, unknown to the com-
mon law, we find that all other species of juristic persons assume in our
law the corporate form. Our terminology indicates that the rights of
eleemosynary foundations and of the state are vested in bodies or aggre-
gates of persons, while that of the Germans points to the fact that the
element of association is insufficient to explain the peculiar qualities of
rights held by some kinds of corporations. The problem of corporate
existence is under the two legal systems practically the same, and in
both it is complicated with questions regarding the nature of trust rights.
§3. Corporations in Relation to Government and Property.— We8/Ernst Freund
commonly distinguish two principal classes of corporations, public and
private. The former includes the state and municipal and other corpora-
tions constituting territorial or administrative subdivisions of the state;
the latter, all other bodies incorporated for common purposes of the
members, for individual profit, and for eleemosynary objects. It might
appear that this distinction coincides with that between the two princi-
pal classes of relations known to the law, government and property. But
if we understand government in a wider sense, it must be incident to
Corporate property relations, and on the other hand corporate govern-
ment is apt to produce corporate property. For the undivided control of
joint rights requires that each associate should be subjected to some
restraint in the interest of common action, and his participation in the
joint control is conditioned upon his submission to such restraint; to this
extent every corporation must enjoy some powers of government over
its members, however rarely they may be called into play. Conversely
the exercise of governmental rights by a body of persons will as a rule
result in the possession of some property, if it be only the records of
proceedings, the necessary apparatus and fixtures for the holding of
meetings, or the ownership of fees or other contributions. That inciden-
tal property rights may assume vast proportions is sufficiently demon-
strated by the example of the state and of large cities.
The technical conception of a corporation has grown up in connec-
tion with property and not with governmental rights. The problem of
corporate existence is substantially the same whether we regard it from
the point of view of government or of property, but the difficulties that
have made themselves felt, and the theories that have been presented for
their solution, have arisen chiefly with regard to property relations and
their incidents of personal capacity. In this essay the corporation will
therefore be treated primarily as a property-holding body.
§4. The Doctrine and Its Difficulties..—The legal recognition of insti-
tutions and bodies of persons as distinctive holders of rights under a
collective name constitutes a definite doctrine, accepted by the courts,
the legislature, and the legal profession as part of the system of the
common law, and influencing the technical treatment of practical rela-
tions. Negatively expressed this doctrine means, that the rights held by
a corporation are not the rights of any physical person, that its members
are not the part owners of the corporate property, nor part creditors or
debtors of the corporate claims and obligations. It follows from this
that, although a person cannot contract with himself, or be both plaintiffThe Legal Nature of the Corporations/9
and defendant in the same action, a corporation can enter into a contract
with one of its own members, can sue him or be sued by him, that a
member cannot set off a corporate claim against his own debt, nor a
corporate debtor use a claim against a member for the like purpose; it
follows that the corporation can hold property in its own name, and that
no change of title takes place, if members are lost or added. The doc-
trine suggests the question: if the corporation is a distinct person in law,
of what nature is this person? Can we conceive of the holding of rights
otherwise than as an attribute of physical personality? How is it pos-
sible, upon any other basis, to deal with notions that are constantly
applied to the holding of rights, and which explain their most important
incidents: intention, notice, good and bad faith, responsibility? How can
we establish, unless we have to deal with individuals, the internal con-
nection between act and liability?
It is obvious that two opposite views may be taken of the problem
thus presented: we may hold that the legal doctrine which sees in the
corporation a distinct person, is contrary to truth and fact; then a supple-
mentary question will be: what is the truth which the doctrine veils and
obscures? Or we may hold that the doctrine correctly expresses actual
relations; then we shall ask further: of what nature is the distinctive
person, which appears in the corporate holding of rights? In the first
case we deal with a fiction, in the second with an organic reality, and we
may therefore distinguish a fiction theory and an organic theory.
§5. The Fiction Theory.—Those who call the corporation an artificial
and fictitious entity, deny to the idea of a distinct legal person substan-
tial reality. They argue that if we treat the corporation as distinct from
any of its members, and claim that the rights of the former are not the
rights of the latter, we come in conflict with the evident and axiomatic
proposition that the aggregate is nothing but the sum of its parts. Again,
if we treat this distinct entity as if it had volition and acting capacity,
and apply to it legal provisions involving both, we run counter to an-
other axiomatic proposition, namely, that only human beings are en-
dowed with such moral and mental qualities as are required for the re-
sponsible exercise of rights. It follows that the legal conception of a
corporation cannot be reconciled with fundamental truth and logic, it
has no basis in the reality of facts, it is a fiction adopted for the purpose
of deducing rights and obligations which could not be deduced with
equal facility from a conception corresponding to the true nature of
things.10/Ernst Freund
The fiction theory strongly predominates at the present time. It is
accepted almost without questioning by our courts and is tacitly as-
sumed by most English and American jurists. The writers on elemen-
tary law are ranged on its side. Austin speaks of “fictitious and legal
persons.” Holland says that the law, “in imitation of the personality of
human beings, recognizes certain groups of men or of property which it
is convenient to treat as subjects of rights and duties, as persons in an
artificial sense.4 “Such a person is not merely the sum total of its com-
ponent members, but something superadded to them. It may remain al-
though they are all changed. The property which it may hold does not
belong to the members either individually or collectively, its claims and
liabilities are its own.”5 Markby states that every right resides in a de-
terminate person or persons, but that rights are sometimes attached to
an aggregate of human beings in such a way that the aggregate is looked
upon as a single person, a fictitious person, of course; also that there is
no difficulty in creating an imaginary person which does not contain
any real person.6 It is true that some text-book writers, following the
authority of Kyd, the author of one of the earliest treatises on corpora-
tions,7 are inclined to repudiate the notion of a fictitious and artificial
person, and to substitute in its place the conception of a collective ca-
pacity of the members of the corporation, but they fail to present an
adequate analysis of this conception.8 The fiction theory has also domi-
nated the civil law since the Middle Ages, and while greatly questioned
in recent  times, continues to find advocates among the ablest continen-
tal jurists.
How do the adherents of the fiction theory explain the nature of the
corporation if it is not what it pretends to be? It seems strange that many
of them should deem it perfectly sufficient to proclaim the conception as
false and contrary to the reality, without yet feeling obliged to show
what the reality is. Austin says, the nature of legal persons is various,
and the ideas for which they stand are extremely complex. They are
persons by figment and for the sake of brevity in discourse. By ascrib-
ing rights and duties to feigned persons instead of the physical persons
whom they in truth concern, we are frequently able to abridge our de-
scriptions of them.9 Holland and Markby do not even attempt an expla-
nation, and the same is true of many German writers. Evidently there is
room for doubt and difference of opinion. If the corporation is a ficti-
tious person, the corporate rights must belong to other physical and real
persons, or they must be rights without personal holders. Which is theThe Legal Nature of the Corporations/11
true view? Or must one view be adopted with regard to one class of
corporations, another view with regard to a different class? Are the rights
of business corporations the rights of the shareholders, and the rights of
charitable corporations in reality nobody’s rights? And how can we con-
ceive of rights without personal holders? All these questions are sug-
gested by the fiction theory, and have been variously answered, where
an answer has been attempted. It is evident that only an examination of
these questions can show what the fiction theory really means, and
whether the resort to a fiction is justifiable or necessary.
§6. The Organic Theory.—The fiction theory has been strongly as-
sailed in recent times by a number of German jurists, who insist that the
distinctiveness of the corporate personality is as real as the individuality
of a physical person. The fiction theory maintains that the attribute of
personality, involving unity of volition, belongs to the individual only,
and the application of the term to composite bodies must rest upon a
figure of speech adopted for convenience of reasoning. Upon this point
the-advocates of the new theory join issue. Professor Gierke, the most
prominent representative of this theory, insists that the physical indi-
vidual represents only one type of personality, that he is not the sole
possessor of such volition, acting capacity, and inherent unity, as we
hold essential to the conception of a person. Above the existence of the
individual there is the existence of the species, and the corporation is
nothing but the legal expression of this fact, which appears as a reality
in all other spheres of life. As the individual will is embodied in the
physical person, so the higher will of the species is embodied in numer-
ous and various forms of association, and as a result we find, beside the
individual, entities of a higher order endowed with volition and acting
capacity. And where the law recognizes such embodied will as a person,
we have a juristic person or a corporation. The law does not create the
corporate persons but finding it in existence invests it with a certain
legal capacity. The corporation rests upon a substratum of physical per-
sons, but it is not identical with them, for out of the association of the
individuals the new personality arises, haying a distinctive sphere of
existence and a will of its own. If corporate rights are distinguished
from individual rights it is because they are controlled by this distinctive
will. The corporation as a person distinct from its members is not a
fiction, but a reality.10
Amidst an apparently irreconcilable conflict of theories there is yet
a substantial consensus of opinion as to practical require meets in the12/Ernst Freund
legal treatment of corporations. That is to say, it is generally agreed that
the law should regard corporations differently from joint owners, that
corporate rights and liabilities should be held apart from individual rights
and liabilities of the members. It is also generally agreed that this object
is best accomplished by treating the corporation, as far as possible, as a
distinct person. Yet it is well understood that many attributes of indi-
vidual personality cannot be applied to this distinct person, and that the
fact of its being composed of physical individuals cannot always be
ignored. And irrespective of conflicting theories the work of adjudica-
tion and legislation has been unceasing in developing and formulating
principles, the practical necessity and soundness of which nobody ques-
tions.
The proper way of approaching the problem of corporate existence
would therefore seem to be: why is it that corporations are treated dif-
ferently from tenants-in-common and joint-tenants? Upon what practi-
cal considerations does the conception of distinctiveness rest? The justi-
fication of the legal doctrine must also be its explanation. Both must
rest upon an analysis of the corporate holding of rights. And this re-
quires as a preliminary a brief review of the elements which enter into
the holding of rights in general, and which distinguish the various classes
of rights from each other.
II. The Protection of Interests, and the Principle of
Representation.
§7. Beneficial Rights. Coincidence of Control and Interest.—Right
and law are correlated, and in a measure coterminous ideas, for every
complete rule of law consists in the creation or recognition of rights or
their corresponding duties, restraints, or obligations. The rule of law
arises out of the conflict of human interests, which it tempers and regu-
lates in accordance with the necessities of social existence. The exist-
ence of a right or duty means that out of the infinite variety of conditions
capable of satisfying human interests, the enjoyment of which is apt to
give rise to disputes, a particular portion or sphere is set apart for the
gratification of some interest to the exclusion or subordination of oth-
ers. To this extent it is true, as Professor Jhering has said, that every
right is a legally protected interest.11 But this gives only one aspect of
the conception. The gratification of the interest usually requires some
active dealing with the conditions so set apart, and this produces theThe Legal Nature of the Corporations/13
element of control as a second constituent factor in the idea of a right,
without which the interest is like a vehicle without motive power. And
although the interest is the objective point in every right, and the control
merely the instrument to secure it, yet it may happen that the means is
legally more important than the end. For while specific conditions sat-
isfy only specific  interests, the possibility of transfer and exchange can
make one right available for the gratification of an indefinite number of
interests, according to the measure of its value. The control then repre-
sents above any specific interest, the power and liberty of choosing be-
tween different interests, which is in itself, both by reason of its ideal
character, and in view of its potential uses, the highest of human inter-
ests. Where this is the case the law may, in the protection of rights,
ignore altogether any specific interests, merging them in the power of
control. In this manner nearly all property rights are held: the law ordi-
narily protects them regardless of the question whether their use subserves
any reasonable interest of the holder, whereas some property rights,
e.g., easements, and all family rights are recognized only in so far as
social or economic benefits are derived from them, and only in so far as
they are rationally used.
In order that the interest may be merged in the control two requisites
must concur. In the first place, the conditions serving the interest must
be transferable from person to person, and in the second place, the inter-
est to be secured must belong to some definite human person capable of
exercising control. Both requirements are normally fulfilled in the right
of property, the most important and familiar of all rights, which has
been of determining influence in moulding our conception of the nature
of private rights in general. Since control and interest are here united in
one person, the idea of the holding of a right has come to connote both
control and interest, emphasizing rather the element of control.
§8. Trust Rights. Separation of Control and Interest.—It is, how-
ever, also possible that the interest of one person may be protected by
vesting the requisite control in another. Such an arrangement may be
necessary or advantageous; necessary where the person to be benefited
is incapable of exercising control, advantageous where he is to be pro-
tected against his own unwise acts of disposition. But then the reason-
ing by which in the normal case of coincidence the interest appears as
merged in the control, evidently loses its basis, for the party in control
and the party in interest being now different persons, the law must take
cognizance of a conflict between them, while where both are one and the14/Ernst Freund
same person, a possible conflict of interests would be legally irrelevant
as a matter of purely internal concern. As the control is capable of being
turned against the interest which it should guard, it must be qualified
and limited, the controlling will must in its turn be controlled by the
requirements of the interest to be served.
In this case we speak of a trust. There is a protected interest and
therefore a right; but the two elements of a right, control and interest,
are separated, and no one person is consequently the holder of the right
in the same sense as in the first, the normal, case. The personal inher-
ence of the right is still clear, though divided according to its two as-
pects, and the question with whom we shall identify the right is simply
one of terminology. A serious controversy on the point can only be based
upon a disregard of the double meaning of a right. In our law the title is
sometimes vested in the trustee, the beneficiary holding an equitable
interest, sometimes in the party in interest, the control being exercised
under a power in trust.
§9. The Securing of Abstract Interests.—It has so far been assumed
that the interest to be protected belongs to some definite person. But it
may also be desirable to secure interests which cannot be identified with
specific persons, to recognize, protect, and advance an abstract and
ideal object for the benefit of all those who may be capable or desirous
of sharing in it, for the benefit, in other words, of humanity and civiliza-
tion. Lands, buildings, funds, and other resources may thus be devoted
to the promotion of science and art, to the cause of religion, charity, and
education. Manifestly the control of such property cannot be vested in
the parties in interest, whose number is altogether indefinite, who con-
stitute in fact an unascertainable portion of humanity, embracing present
and future generations, and who cannot possibly cooperate in the per-
formance of legal acts. Such interests can be legally protected only by
vesting the control separate and apart from the interest, i.e., by creating
trust rights.
There is here, however, a peculiar difficulty in identifying the right
with the interest. If A controls certain property for the benefit of B. we
may call B the holder of the property, not meaning thereby to imply any
personal agency on B’s part, but merely indicating with reference to
what interest the control is to be exercised. If we would accomplish the
like purpose where A controls property for the benefit of an abstract
and ideal interest, we should have to designate that interest by a name,
and identify the holding of the right with that name; for the interest hasThe Legal Nature of the Corporations/15
no distinct personal inherence. This, in fact, is constantly done. We speak
of rights held by a museum or a library, by a hospital or by a college.
We mean thereby that certain relations and resources are controlled, no
matter by what particular individuals, for the service and benefit of
well-defined aims and purposes to be pursued under given conditions
and through prescribed channels, all of which is understood or can be
ascertained by reference to the name of the institution; and conversely
an obligation may exist in favor of some person, to be satisfied out of
certain funds, no matter through whose agency the payment will be made.
We thus personify a complex of interests by assimilating it to a personal
beneficiary, being well aware that what we personify has no volition or
acting capacity; a fiction which is as harmless as it is useful, like so
many others to which we resort constantly for the convenience of thought
and speech. In this way we can also understand in what sense the Ger-
man jurists treat the “Stiftung” or trust endowment as a juristic person.
The “Stiftung” is a “Zweckvermögen,” a fund belonging to a definite
purpose, belonging to it as if the purpose were the owner. The personi-
fication of the purpose is necessarily fictitious, and the fiction supplies
the absence of any determinate person on the side of the interest, while
the control is of course in the hands of real persons.
§10. The Protection of Joint Interests.—The law may also be called
upon to accord its protection to a number of persons in the common
enjoyment of an interest. The community of interest and consequent
joint relation may be necessary or voluntary. The necessity may result
from temporary or permanent conditions. A community of interests
representing a temporary necessity exists in the case of the descent of
property from a Common ancestor to a number of heirs. The necessity
is permanent, where a number of persons are alike affected by condi-
tions of indivisible operation believed to be essential to the existence or
the welfare of all, and therefore calling for an undivided control on be-
half of all; the political community is typical of this class. The joint
relation is voluntary, where the united pursuit of common interests, ei-
ther by the common control of property, or by control of the action of
each member, or by both, results in a saving of energy and of resources.
For there are many things the enjoyment of which is not necessarily
diminished by being shared by a number of persons; and a combination
of resources in harmonious cooperation may bring returns to each party
far in excess of what he would procure by the separate and independent
employment of his own means. The distinct purpose of the joint relation16/Ernst Freund
in these cases is the possibility of undivided control through which such
advantages are obtained. Nearly all private associations belong to this
latter class.
In order that we may speak of the protection of a number of persons
in the common enjoyment of an interest, two conditions must concur:
the persons must pursue the interest jointly, and the joint interest must
be legally secured to them; in other words, there must be a joint relation,
and the joint relation must result in joint rights. Either one or both of
these conditions are absent from certain forms of community of interest
which should be eliminated before we proceed to discuss the nature of
joint rights I shall, therefore, consider, first, community of interest with-
out association, and, second, associations without joint rights.
§11. Community of Interest without Association.—Without associa-
tion the identity of interest between several persons is legally irrelevant,
though it may be practically of great importance and lead to a spontane-
ous and unorganized adjustment of the activity by which the same ob-
ject is pursued by many persons at the same time. There are great inter-
ests which constantly set in motion human activity in the same direc-
tion, ideal as well as material, charity, religion, art and science, and the
increase of national wealth. But the idea of the joint relation requires in
addition to the identity of purpose a connecting tie between a number of
persons with reference to that purpose, and this distinguishes the insti-
tution from the abstract force as two distinct factors in social life. Pow-
erful as the abstract interest may be in itself, it has no distinct represen-
tation in the conflict of interests except through corporate or trust orga-
nization (including that of the state) or through the voluntary action of
individuals.
The lack of association also characterizes the conception of what is
called the public, the mass of the people in the widest sense, indetermi-
nate as to extent and composition, in so far as they pursue identical
interests, yet act in that pursuit separately or without deliberate coop-
eration. If a street, a park, or a museum is thrown open to the use of the
public, the service of certain interests is contemplated without restric-
tion to any class or community, but the use is expected to be enjoyed
primarily by individuals, and the possibility of simultaneous enjoyment
may be practically limited to moderate numbers. If under the privilege
of public use a large number of people congregate in the same place,
physical proximity will form a kind of rudimentary relation between
them. They may constitute an audience, a mass-meeting, a procession, aThe Legal Nature of the Corporations/17
crowd or a mob, but in neither capacity can they be identified with the
public. As a legally disconnected mass of individuals the public cannot
control legal rights, but is merely a beneficiary: the rights of the public
are exercised by the state or its subdivisions, and in so far as enjoyment
is concerned, by any individual who can show an interest.
§12. Associations without the Joint Control of Legal Relations.—
Association by itself does not constitute joint or common right. A num-
ber of persons pursuing common interests may meet, deliberate, and
resolve upon certain courses of action by which a conflict of interests
may be avoided or other beneficial results obtained; yet unless the asso-
ciation as such also exercises a legal control with reference to these
common interests, it will be legally irrelevant except possibly from a
political or administrative point of view. This applies to the numerous
private associations organized for social intercourse, for scientific, lit-
erary, artistic purposes, to discuss and agitate political and social re-
form, or to guard professional or trade interests, which exercise no binding
power over their members, and which hold no common property for
their purposes.
Political parties should be classed in the same category, for while
there is associated and organized action for common purposes, the fruits
of the party victory will be held not by the party as such, but by its
members as organs of the government. The party desires to be vested
with power as representing the people, not as representing the party
associates, and the party candidates become officers of the state. The
same observation applies to any portion of any community which by
concerted action endeavors to control the formation of the community
will; for the ideal aim of those cooperating must be to win over all the
members and thus to merge themselves entirely in the community. Mem-
bers of a party may, however, for the better accomplishment of party
ends acquire common rights of property, and for that purpose assume
corporate character. They will then form a distinct organization with a
definite membership, which is not identical with the party in the politi-
cal sense of the term.
There is no firmer social organization than the family, yet the fam-
ily as such need not, and at present in most legal systems does not,
control any rights. The association here produces legal relations, for
there are rights between members of the family, and rights against third
parties based on family relations, but the family itself does not enter into
contracts or become a party to litigation, or hold title to real estate.18/Ernst Freund
Natural cohesion and organization may exist without the legal protec-
tion of the common enjoyment of the common interests.
These forms of association should again be distinguished from rela-
tions in which a number of people are subject to a common authority
without having joined each other by voluntary acts of mutual connec-
tion. In these cases there is strictly speaking no association, but a sum of
individual contractual relations entered into by one person with a num-
ber of persons acting separately, and affecting them all alike. There is
an aggregate body and the aggregation may have its social, moral, or
psychological effects, but for legal purposes its existence is irrelevant.
Such is the relation between the workmen in a factory, the staff of writ-
ers on a newspaper, the pupils or students in a school or college. The
factory, the newspaper, or the school may be owned and managed by a
corporation, but then the corporation does not coincide with the eco-
nomic or social organism. There is no joint control vested in the joint
parties in interest.
§13. The Joint Holding of Rights. Difficulties of Joint Control.—Let
us now return to the community of interest which is legally secured by
the joint holding of rights. The common interest has here a double as-
pect; it claims security both against outsiders and against defection on
the part of members. All parties to the joint relation have an interest in
the preservation of the integrity of the common right as against third
parties,—an interest as to which perfect harmony is natural, and which
is identicalwiththelikeinterestof the holder of anindividual right And each
party may also have as against any other an interest in the preservation
of the joint relation and of the undivided control. This interest becomes
relevant only where for some reason cooperation between the joint par-
ties fails. As long as they concur in every act of control, the aspect of the
right is exactly the same as that of the normal individual right in which
control and interest are united in the same person. But as soon as such
concurrence fails as a consequence of disagreement or through other
difficulties, the problem arises how the joint holding of the right and the
community of interest can be reconciled with each other.
Two different methods of dealing with this problem are conceiv-
able. The law may insist upon concurrent action and offer as an alterna-
tive the right to have the joint relation dissolved. In that case the power
of active control is suspended or qualified until either concurrence of
action is made possible or until the dissolution is consummated. In case
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ance of the joint relation will be sacrificed to what becomes substan-
tially a veto power of any other associate. It is also clear that this method
is unavailable where the community relation is based upon permanent
necessity and hence indissoluble.
Or as a second method the law may accept the action of those who
can be brought to concur in place of the action of all the associates,
ignoring those who fail to act, or determining, where all are willing to
act, but disagree as to the course to be pursued, which of several con-
tending parties or factions shall prevail over the others. In either case all
are bound by a portion which assumes a representative character; in
other words, the associates are bound by representation. I call this form
of representation original, and distinguish it from that which rests upon
delegation and which is common to the exercise of all rights, several as
well as joint.
§14. The Principle of Representation.—Representative action under
express delegation, by which joint rights are commonly exercised, is
easily understood upon principles of individual right, being analogous
to the relation between agent and principal. Since, however, this method
of representative action presupposes an act of delegation, it does not
solve entirely the difficulties of concurrent action, which must be over-
come with regard to the delegating act, and which are, therefore, only
thrown one stage further back and made of less frequent occurrence.
Principles of individual right, as generally accepted, are, however, inad-
equate to explain what I have called original representation, and this
form of representation must therefore be further considered.
Original representation assumes two forms, according to the diffi-
culty encountered. Where a number of the joint parties altogether ab-
stain by absence or by silence from expressing their will, those who act
are regarded as representing all. Where there is dissension between those
who act in expressing their will, the majority overcomes the minority.
The former principle, in case of a body consisting of a definite and
unchanging number, is modified by the requirement of the attendance of
a certain proportion, normally the majority of the members, and is then
known as the principle of the quorum, while the latter is known as the
majority principle. Both principles are recognized by the common law,
being recommended by their comparative simplicity, while a principle
of greater intrinsic value, as, e.g., that not the pars major, but the pars
major et sanior,12 should prevail, is apt to be so much more difficult of
application as to be of inferior practical value. Either principle may, of20/Ernst Freund
course, yield to different agreement or positive enactment, so that, e.g.,
a more than simple majority may be demanded where the presumption
is in favor of the continuance of existing conditions and arrangements.
The principles may also involve considerable difficulties in the details
of their operation, and, conceivably, it may be as impossible to bring
about the presence of a quorum or the concurrence of a majority as it
may be impossible to bring about unanimity. It is sufficient that experi-
ence has demonstrated the two principles to be substantially adequate to
accomplish their object and to secure the community of interest in such
a manner that there is the constant possibility of subjecting the joint
resources to united disposition, to make, in other words, the joint con-
trol an indivisible control.
Where action by representation is recognized we may speak of a
collective instead of a mere joint holding of rights.
The collective holding of rights is not legally secured to all joint
relations; being opposed to the principles upon which individual several
rights are held, it has rather been regarded as the exceptional and abnor-
mal form. We must distinguish joint relations in which the principle of
representation is completely absent; and joint relations in which it is
imperfectly recognized, from those to which it fully belongs. It will be
instructive to examine the former classes of joint relations in order to
see what legal protection the common interest enjoys without the opera-
tion of the principle.
§15. Joint Relations without Representative Action. (a) Tenancy in
Common and Joint Tenancy.—In tenancy in common and joint ten-
ancy the principle of original representation is completely absent. There
may be delegation according to the general rules of agency, but as it
proceeds from the will of each party it depends upon the continuing
consent of each; the principle of representation is not secured to each
party against any other. All parties must concur in every act; there is no
outward unity of name, but the formal title is attached to the several
joint holders, and upon a change of individuals a change of title is nec-
essary. If the absence of the principle is not felt as a grave defect, it is
due to the nature of the relations to which these forms of joint holding
are usually applied. Tenancy in common—except where it is an incident
to partnership—is apt to be temporary and to tend towards dissolution;
frequently it is based upon the accident of common descent or succes-
sion, and has no intrinsic guaranties of duration. The question of joint
control, therefore, as a rule, presents no serious problem, for if concur-The Legal Nature of the Corporations/21
rent action meets with difficulty, a partition dissolving the relation, which
is not based upon a strong community of interest, is a ready expedient.
Joint tenancy is the usual form of holding by a number of trustees. Here
there is unity of interest, and necessity of undivided control, and as the
interests of the joint holders are indivisible, partition cannot be resorted
to; but the superior control of equitable jurisdiction is sufficient to pre-
vent dissensions from becoming fatal to the interest which claims pro-
tection. It is characteristic that tenancy in common, which adheres most
closely to the principles of individual right, and follows in fact from
their logical application, is also the loosest form of joint relation known
to the law. In those exceptional cases in which joint tenants hold benefi-
cially, and not as trustees, the right of partition attaches to their relation
as well as to tenancy in common.
§16. (b) Partnership.—The form of joint relation known as a partner-
ship is in many respects sui generis. The partnership has some strong
features of unity; in commercial intercourse it is letdown by a common
name, the partnership firm, under which ordinary legal acts are per-
formed. Above all the principle of original representation is partly rec-
ognized in the authority of each partner to bind the firm in the ordinary
course of business by acts done in the firm name, an authority which
rests upon the nature of the relation and not upon express delegation,
and the exclusion of which by agreement must therefore be brought to
the notice of third parties, in order to be binding upon them. This is
usually expressed by saying that each partner is the agent of all others,
but it would be better to say that each partner is the representative of the
firm. Courts have recognized repeatedly that it is impossible to deal
with partnership relations without the conception of unity expressed in
the firm name,13 and the distinctiveness of its existence asserts itself in
equity in the matter of accounting and especially in the adjustment of
individual and partnership liabilities with their respective preferences
as to individual and partnership property. The unity of the partnership is
also recognized in the so-called joint-debtor acts, under which, in an
action against the partners, judgment may be taken against all, though
some only are served with process, and execution may be issued upon
such judgment against the joint property of the firm.14 This must be
justified by the theory, that as to partnership property—which for that
purpose constitutes a distinct fund—each partner fully represents the
firm. If this view were carried to its logical consequences the judgment
should be treated as a regular judgment in personam against the firm22/Ernst Freund
and therefore available against firm property wherever found; but it
seems that such judgments are not recognized as having extra-territorial
effect.15 The same view might also well be extended by allowing action
to be brought by and against firms, irrespective of changes in member-
ship occurring since the cause of action accrued or during the course of
the proceedings, and also irrespective of the fact that one person be-
longs to two litigating firms. The commercial codes based upon the
French law have yielded to this demand for further recognition of the
distinctiveness of the firm, which in England and America has been
generally resisted by a more conservative spirit of legislation.
While in some respects the undivided control of partnership affairs
may be strengthened by contractual stipulations, the relation cannot be
said to constitute a perfect form of collective holding. For the principle
of original representation fails in transactions beyond the ordinary course
of business, as, e.g., in acts done by deed,16 nor is it within its range of
absolute operation, for it does not prevail against express dissent, nor is
there an unqualified recognition of majority rule.17 Moreover, the con-
sistence of the community interest has not reached such a point that it is
secured against the accidents of death or disability, and if, as a matter of
fact, partnerships sometimes enjoy the same longevity as corporations,
this duration has no legal guaranties.
The very defect, however, which remains is in one sense an advan-
tage, and may be regarded as an expression of deliberate legal policy.
The partnership relation is based upon personal. trust and confidence,
and the success of the common venture depends upon harmonious and
voluntary cooperation; hence death, permanent disability, or gross mis-
conduct are believed to shake its essential foundations and to make dis-
solution a matter of right. If, however, a partnership for a fixed term is
to be upheld, even in case of dissensions, the recognition of the principle
of representation, and especially of majority powers, follows as a mat-
ter of logical necessity.18
§17. Methods of Joint Holding and the Number of Joint Parties.—It
should be observed that the forms of joint holding in which the principle
of representation is not, or not fully, recognized tenancy in common,
joint tenancy, and partnership—have as a rule in common the character-
istic feature of a small number of joint parties. This fact is significant if
taken in connection with the psychological probability that where the
community of interest has any considerable strength, a small number of
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law by asserting the principle of concurrent action strikes perhaps the
proper adjustment between the joint interest and the several interest of
individual liberty. But the difficulties of concurrent action increase rap-
idly with an increase of numbers, and the point is soon reached where
they become so great as to make actual joint control impossible.
While therefore small numbers are not merely normal but essential
to a successful operation of the rule of actual concurrence of control in
joint relations, the principle of representation becomes a practical ne-
cessity where the number of associates is considerable. As the history of
joint-stock companies shows large associations tend inevitably to as-
sume the collective form of holding rights, the only other alternative
teeing to debar them from holding rights under their own control alto-
gether, and to protect their common interests by the creation of trusts.
This of course does not mean that a few joint parties cannot hold rights
collectively, but it does mean that with regard to them this mode of
holding is less necessary, and perhaps less apt to produce the best re-
sults. It is interesting to note that in Germany it has been thought advis-
able to allow the formation of partnerships with limited liability (ex-
tending to all the partners, and not as in case of our limited partnerships
only to some), in order to restrict the character of a joint-stock company
to associations of a larger number seeking their constituency among the
public at large.19  The application of the collective principle with all its
incidents to joint relations of small membership is a product of recent
times, and has undoubtedly been induced by the desire to secure one
advantage which is not even essential to this principle, namely, the limi-
tation of liability. A distinction between large companies appealing to
the public for the placing of their shares or for membership, and close
associations formed of a few persons, might serve valuable purposes
under any legal system.
The operation of the principle of representation is apt to differ as it
is either applied to large or to small associations. A comparison be-
tween two opposite extremes will make this clear. In the political com-
munity—the most conspicuous type of a large association—actual con-
currence of all members is impossible, and all direct action must be by
original representation, so that only a portion of the members becomes
active and generally also so that between them a majority prevails over
a minority. Besides, action by original representation will be almost
confined to acts of delegation, and the performance of nearly all legal
acts must be by delegated representation, i.e., outsiders do not deal with24/Ernst Freund
either quorum or majority. On the other hand in a business corporation
of three or five members, the acts of delegation will generally be unani-
mous, many legal acts can be performed by direct action of the body,
and the delegated powers are apt to be held by the members, so that only
in exceptional cases an associate will lose his share in the joint control.
In all associations, however, the recognition of the principle will secure
undivided control, and the collective body will consequently act and
appear as a unit.
§18. Relation of Control and Interest in Representative Action.—
Where a number of persons hold rights in common and yet need not all
concur in every legal act by which these rights are exercised, it is impos-
sible to speak of perfect coincidence of control and interest. Neither is
there, however, an absolute separation between the two elements. For
while it is true that there are parties in interest who are eventually con-
trolled by the acts of others, they are yet not excluded in the same man-
ner as the beneficiaries of an active trust. This is quite clear in the case
of delegated representation where those in control derive their powers
from those who have joined in the act of delegation. It is, however, also
true that there is no absolute exclusion in the case of original represen-
tation. Voluntary abstention from cooperation means acquiescence and
submission to the care of those who are more active. Active opposition
again on the part of those who are finally ignored means that they are
given an opportunity of influencing the formation of the controlling will
in its preliminary stages by the assertion of their wishes and opinions,
and their not prevailing indicates some form of weakness in their posi-
tion, the result depending upon a trial of strength. A share in the control
is legally secured to all, although it may prove to be incapable of affect-
ing the final act.
Undoubtedly there is a strong element of trust in representative ac-
tion. The interest of all the associates is a determining factor in control-
ling those who act as representatives. This is especially clear in the case
of delegated representation, and boards of directors and other officers
are generally considered and treated as trustees for the corporators. But
it also applies to the quorum and the majority, for the security of the
joint interests is the justification and therefore also the limitation of their
power to represent. Should a majority act for their own benefit clearly
adversely to the interests of the association, the minority would not be
bound thereby. The difficulty in such cases lies not in the principle, but
in the proof of its violation.20The Legal Nature of the Corporations/25
There are, however, other elements in which the idea of a trust does
not appear to be controlling. The quorum and the majority pursue inter-
ests which they feel to be their own, and they are justified in following
their own discretion in judging what the common benefit requires, al-
though the result will be the preferment of their own advantage over that
of the minority. Acting in the exercise of their own rights, they are not
accountable to those whom they bind by their action, though it may
result in loss which might have been avoided by greater care and pru-
dence. Above all while a trust is committed to a definite person or per-
sons, the functions of representatives and represented in the majority
rule are fluctuating and indeterminate, so that no one in particular can
be regarded as trustee or as beneficiary.
§19. The Personal Factor of the Bond of Association.—In order to
understand the nature of original representation, it is necessary to take
into account the personal factor of the bond of association, which coop-
erates with the objective factor of the common interest in shaping the
controlling will. It produces a mutual psychological influence to which
all the associates are subjected, and which has a tendency to neutralize
individual divergencies of opinion and of will. If those who abstain from
acting are bound by those who act, if the minority must yield to the
majority, it is because in either case the bond of association manifests
itself more powerfully in those who are accepted as representatives. On
the other hand, the existence and common recognition of a personal
bond gives to those whose voice is legally ineffectual a moral control
over those who act, fortified by the possibility of a change of mutual
position, so that they rise above the position of mere beneficiaries, a
moral influence which is especially strong in the political community.
The common bond strengthens the common interest by giving it a vis-
ible substratum and thus emphasizing its distinctness from the individual
interests of any associate, and keeping the consciousness of its obliga-
tion alive. It also acts upon the holders of delegated powers by adding to
the obligation of the trust the feeling of personal responsibility. A vari-
ety of circumstances may reveal the influence of this personal nexus,
and the law may insist upon the presence of such circumstances as a
condition of its recognizing the action of some of the associates as stand-
ing for the action of all. So action may proclaim itself as representative,
and secure legal recognition as such, by outward marks of time, place,
or form, indicating a reference to the bond of association. The represen-
tative character will be strengthened by giving all the associates an op-26/Ernst Freund
portunity to cooperate in the formation of the collective will, so that the
final decision clearly shows in which direction the bond has operated
more strongly. Provisions as to notice and hearing, and manner of meet-
ing, deliberation, and voting, give evidence of these various consider-
ations, and find in them their rational explanation. Such fixed rules make
it unnecessary to establish in every particular case the representative
quality of the act by tracing its connection with psychological influ-
ences springing from join action. That the tracing of such connection is
legally possible, is shown by the crime of conspiracy, where unlawful
acts may be treated as representative without any recognized forms.
The operation of the bond of association makes the recognition of repre-
sentative action intelligible, and gives to an apparently arbitrary rule a
psychological justification.
§20. Effect of Representative Action: (a) The Element of Subjective
Differentiation.—The principle of original representation has the ef-
fect that some persons may by their acts dispose of rights belonging to
others, or, in other words, that rights may be disposed of without proper
legal acts on the part of those to whom they belong. It means, on the
other hand, that acts done by a person which would normally affect his
rights, may fail to have that effect as to rights held by him jointly with
others. The resolution of a majority imposes obligations on the minor-
ity, and the deed of a shareholder purporting to convey an undivided
share in corporate property is wholly ineffectual. The regular connec-
tion between the acts of a person and the liability resulting therefrom is
broken through by the operation of the principle. The justification of
this anomaly lies in the peculiar position of the preferred and subordi-
nated or disregarded parties respectively: they are treated by the law
exclusively with reference to a common relation sustained by them to
each other and to a common purpose, and the force of their acts is deter-
mined according as they express more or less strongly the effect of the
relation The essential point is that what determines preference or exclu-
sion is not specific personality, but the relative position of the person in
the representation of an interest. It is not the question of A B C D against
E and F. but the question of a majority against a minority, or the ques-
tion of those acting under the common bond against those failing so to
act. The principle of discrimination in the regulation of acts and their
effects is different from that followed in other forms of holding rights.
The law does not connect the right with A or B or C absolutely or
unqualifiedly, but only in so far as they remain within a certain sphereThe Legal Nature of the Corporations/27
of interest and within the nexus of a certain association. This element,
which is of fundamental importance in the conception of a corporation,
may be designated as subjective differentiation.
This differentiation is far from being an unreal abstraction. We com-
monly judge and treat the acts of a person differently as he acts in differ-
ent capacities. Since each act may be traced to different influences sur-
roundings, its effects can be placed accordingly, and the law can draw
practical conclusions of the greatest importance from a division which
has its root in differences of psychological operation. The subjective
differentiation explains why a shareholder of a railroad company has no
direct right of property in the rolling stock, the roadbed, the station
houses, etc., of the road; he cannot use the cars at his pleasure, he can
give no orders to the employees, and if he performs acts of ownership,
he is a trespasser. The reason is that his property rights can be exercised
only through the nexus of association, only in a meeting with his associ-
ates, and then only through the performance of certain functions in a
certain manner, and with these qualifications none of the acts above
specified would be possible. Acting in a meeting with his associates, the
relative strength of position will determine the effect of his acts; his will
may prevail or be defeated, according to a preponderance of concor-
dance between the associates, but his will and action outside of this
connection has no effect whatever.
§21. Effect of Representative Action: (b) The Objective Determina-
tion of the Inherence of Rights.—The element of differentiation is ac-
companied by another peculiar modification of the holding of rights,
which indeed in some respects is only another aspect of the same pro-
cess. From saying: the right does not belong to A generally, but to A
only in a certain capacity, it is only a short step to saying: the right
belongs to the personal holder and representative of a certain interest,
no matter whether this personal holder is A or B. We substitute in other
words for a specific person a representative capacity, the right follows
its object, i.e., the interest, instead of its “subject,” i.e., the holder. We
may therefore call this the objective determination of the inherence of
rights, which forms another important element in the conception of a
corporation.
It must be remembered how important it is to connect a right with
some ascertainable person in order to identify it, and to secure it against
other conflicting interests. The name of some individual person usually
furnishes this means of identification, which we call the title, and a28/Ernst Freund
change of persons requires a transfer of title, which may be attended
with inconvenience and difficulty. But through this process of objective
determination, the means of identification is a certain interest embodied
in concrete conditions, so that the title remains the same as long as the
interest continues, regardless of the change of persons to whom the in-
terest is secured; they become the indifferent and shifting actors of a
character which is not affected by their individuality. This treatment is
likewise based upon the practical consideration that an interest fixed by
association is mote powerful in determining the control of ways and
means by which it is served, than the will and discretion of any specific
individual. The same consideration may also demand that liabilities
should shift with the shifting incidence of interest, rather than remain
attached to a person irrespective of his relation to the interest, by which
the act creating the liability was induced.
§22. Other Applications of the Elements of Differentiation and Ob-
jective Determination.—The elements of differentiation and objective
determination are incident to representative action and therefore to the
collective holding of rights; but they can also be discovered in other
legal relations, to which aggregates of persons are not parties.
1. Corporations Sole.—The common law knows a species of corpora-
tions called corporations sole, consisting of only one person for the time
being. King, bishop, and parson are the most conspicuous examples of
this class. It is true that there is here a succession of several persons
constituting the body corporate, but we cannot speak of an association
and consequently we do not find the peculiar conditions which the asso-
ciated holding of rights creates. In the case of the corporation sole it
obviously cannot be the difficulty of concurrent action which demands
an anomalous treatment, there is no necessity for original or delegated
representation. The difference from an individual beneficial right lies
here in the unity of title between the successive holders, so that property
devolves from one to the other without formalities of transfer, inter vi-
vos or mortis causa. In other words there is an objective determination
of the inherence of the right; each successive holder appears merely as
the representative of an interest more enduring than the term of his hold-
ing. Just as we regard each member of a corporation aggregate not in
his individual capacity, but merely as one of a number of associates, so
in the corporation sole the individual is merged in the abstract character
of the temporary holder of a perpetual interest. Conceivably the same
idea might have been extended to a succession of sole trustees or to aThe Legal Nature of the Corporations/29
succession of individual officers holding title in their official name, as
was actually done in the case of the Chamberlain of the City of Lon-
don.21 The idea of a corporation sole has on the whole been less accept-
able than that of a corporation aggregate, probably because it is not
called for by the same practical necessity. It is met with now and then in
this country, but has so far not found any novel application.22 The cor-
poration sole was also unknown to the Roman law and is foreign to the
systems based upon it.
2. One Man Companies.—We hear occasionally of one-man compa-
nies, corporations in which all the property is virtually held by a single
individual. A person desires to engage a portion of his property in an
enterprise and to limit his liabilities arising out of it to the funds so
engaged. As the law does not allow him to do this outright, he uses the
expedient of organizing a corporation with nominal and dependent share-
holders, as required by law, by which his individual control is formally
and outwardly covered. From a legal and technical point of view this is
a perfect corporation, though perhaps a fraud upon the law and a fraud
upon creditors.23 If we regard substance rather than form, the arrange-
ment simply shows that the principle of limitation of liability could be
applied to individual as well as to joint undertakings. An individual
trading with limited liability would not as such constitute even a corpo-
ration sole. The relation would borrow from the principles of corporate
existence the separation of rights and obligations according to different
spheres of interest within the same individual, i.e., the element of differ-
entiation, not that of objective determination of the inherence of rights.
Proper safeguards analogous to corporate organization, would be nec-
essary to mark and secure this differentiation and to prevent confusion
and fraud; but the difficulty peculiar to corporate relations, that of se-
curing undivided control, would not exist.
3. Trust and Official Relations.—The element of differentiation is nec-
essarily recognized in every office and trust. As the office is a part of the
corporate organization, this means that the process of differentiation is
applied not merely to members, but also to holders of delegated powers.
With reference to officers it appears with particular clearness in those
cases in which it has been held, that a corporate officer, when visiting a
foreign jurisdiction on private business, does not carry his official char-
acter with him, and therefore cannot under such conditions be served
with process.24 Much of the law of officers and trustees is a develop-
ment of the idea of differentiation of personality, although the principle30/Ernst Freund
is affected in both relations by so many peculiar modifications that the
analogy to corporate membership is unsafe and misleading.
4. Rights and Obligations attached to Property.—The idea of objec-
tive determination is applied in many cases in which a right is attached,
not to a definite individual, but to a certain sphere of interest repre-
sented by some property, and passes with that property as an appurte-
nance. Such is notably the case of easements or real servitudes and of
covenants running with the land. Here the property and the interest at-
tached to it is more permanent than the individuality of any holder. The
understanding of the relation can be facilitated by personifying the domi-
nant property and regarding it as the holder of the right, but this is of
course a mere figure of speech, and the contention of some German
jurists that the property here constitutes a juristic person, is a somewhat
absurd extension of the idea of personality.25 Analogous, and of great
practical importance is the connection of obligations with certain prop-
erty as liens or encumbrances, so that they follow the property into
whosesoever hands it may pass. The element of objective determination
means here the transfer of obligations without express release or as-
sumption. A further peculiarity is added if the extent of the obligation is
limited so that it can be enforced only out of the property which it fol-
lows. Taxes on land and under certain circumstances mortgages (the
German “Grundschuld”) may have that character. Again, in this case,
the principle of limitation of liability forms an additional analogy to
corporate relations.
It thus appears that the characteristic elements which the collective
holding of rights produces—differentiation and objective determination—
are found under other names and in different forms, in other depart-
ments of the law.
III. The Aggregate Body
§23. Unity and Distinctiveness of the Association.—If we correctly
understand the qualified nature of the inherence of rights in the persons
associated, the conception of the association follows easily as a simple
sum of the rights so qualified. It has been shown how a member of a
corporation can exercise corporate rights only within the nexus of asso-
ciation as one of many; applying this observation to all the members, it
appears that individual exercise must be consolidated into collective
exercise. It is the result of the principle of representation that harmoni-
ous action is eventually secured, notwithstanding the number end diver-The Legal Nature of the Corporations/31
sity of controlling persons, and that the combined resources are sub-
jected to undivided control; and outwardly therefore the controlling will
appears as a unit. It is natural to disregard the fact that the holders of the
right are many, if the many act virtually as one, and their acting so is
legally secured. The same is true if we regard passive instead of active
capacity, and unity of status and of liability are naturally correlative to
unity of action. This outward unity is expressed by a collective name
and title, which stands for an aggregate, but an aggregate of similar
component parts. The aggregate must partake of the nature of its con-
stituent elements, and the elements being individuals qualified by sub-
jective differentiation, the aggregate body must be qualified in like man-
ner. The fact of association indeed aids the process of differentiation; it
is very much easier to distinguish the acts of a person according to
different capacities, where in one capacity he appears as only one of a
large number, than where both capacities relate to his own person ex-
clusively; for the presence or absence of personal connection is more
easily traced than the mere connection with different interests. It is con-
sequently not a legal refinement, but a very common popular view, to
distinguish between the individual rights and acts of a person and the
rights and acts of an association of which he is a member. The larger the
association, the clearer the difference becomes; for the member’s inter-
est as member is apt to be remote and insignificant as compared with his
individual interests, and his individual power of control will be propor-
tionately slight. To apply as a matter of course, and in all cases, facts
and attributes, which the law recognizes with regard to the body, to each
member individually, must lead to incorrect results, for the true mean-
ing and understanding of facts is perverted and distorted if they are torn
from their connection. The larger the body is, the more strongly this
observation applies. The law expresses this view graphically by treat-
ing corporation and member as two absolutely different holders, and for
all practical purposes only such treatment can do justice to the nature of
the relation.
§24. Different Corporations Composed of the Same Persons.— Since
the corporation is a body embracing only qualified personalities, it fol-
lows that the same persons may be associated into different bodies cor-
porate having different names and pursuing different purposes. Acting
under one bond of association they hold certain rights and incur certain
liabilities, acting under another bond these rights and liabilities do not
affect them and leave the resources embraced under this latter bond32/Ernst Freund
untouched. Legal relations can under these circumstances exist between
the two bodies without difficulty. Let us assume that a club as such is
unable or does not desire to hold title to real estate. The members orga-
nize a stock company for the purpose of acquiring a club house, and
between themselves subscribe to all the stock. Clearly, it cannot be said
that the club owns its property, for the interests held by the same per-
sons in the two capacities are entirely distinct. The club can enjoy the
use of the property only as the tenant of the stock company; in such
enjoyment the rights of the members are equal, but liable to be alto-
gether divested by expulsion from the club; the interests of the stock-
holders vary according to the amount of stock held by each, but each
individual interest is indigestible. is no legal guaranty that the managing
officers of the two bodies will be or remain the same, it is far more likely
that each will have from the beginning its distinct organization, and
without special arrangements and repeated transfers of stock the mem-
bership of the two bodies will be sure to become different in course of
time. Contractual relations can exist between the two bodies, and the
club will probably hold a lease from the company. The distinctiveness
of interests is sufficient to prevent legal confusion.
If, however, the club is incorporated and as a corporation owns its
property, the social body and the property-holding body are one and the
same, and not two separate bodies. The holding of the property is purely
incidental and subservient to the social objects, and the social organiza-
tion will in the last resort control all resources. Under these circum-
stances there can be no distinctiveness of rights and obligations. The
ultimate test must be: is there such independence of interest and control
that the acts of the one organization can under no circumstances legally
affect the rights of the other? Unless there is such independence, the
practical identity of power of control will prevent the effectual separa-
tion of rights and liabilities, and apart from that the separation of bodies
has no meaning.26
While different interests are apt to be pursued under different bonds
of association, diversity of interests does not by itself prevent corporate
identity. Should a trades union organized for common protection of trade
interests branch out into cooperative enterprises yielding profit, or into
charitable or social activity, without forming new organizations for these
purposes, the identity of the body would be preserved, for the connect-
ing bond would remain the same, the continuity of personal nexus w
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control and therefore would not be protected against each other. A dis-
tinct act of association, though by the same persons, for a new purpose,
constitutes a different nexus, and creates a new corporation. The con-
trol of the new interest is then independent and cannot be impaired in
behalf of the other interests.
The law may insist upon a distinct act of association for each dis-
tinct purpose and thus make a differentiation into separate bodies neces-
sary. The law may however also allow the same body to pursue different
interests, and at the same time guard against the confusion of these
interests, by creating a separate trust for each, and compelling its faith-
ful execution by the corporation. This is possible where the whole cor-
porate organization partakes of the nature of a trust and the members
are not intended to have exclusive control of the beneficial interest em-
bodied in the corporate resources, so in case of municipal corporations,
and—to a certain extent—of religious societies. Whether there are sev-
eral distinct bodies or one body vested with distinct trusts must be deter-
mined from the legal provisions applicable to each case. In England
many cities as such are constituted counties; the city and county of New
York, comprising the same population and territory, are distinct corpo-
rations. The city of New York supports and manages its schools, but in
many parts of the United States there are school districts which, while
covering the same area as the town, are distinctly incorporated for school
purposes, as the town is incorporated for municipal purposes. The dis-
tinction is somewhat refined but not meaningless. If there are two sepa-
rate corporations they can contract with each other and sue each other;
this is possible where there is only one body with two different func-
tions. The separate recognition of two bodies may also become essential
for purposes of statutory or constitutional construction. The law, in
making provision for one body, may contemplate only the one set of
purposes and may intend to leave the other untouched. Suppose the
Legislature were prevented by constitutional inhibition from special leg-
islation affecting cities, the right of such legislation might still be open
as to the county, though coextensive in territory and population. The
distinction would probably be legitimate, though cases can be imagined
where it might be used as a cloak for an evasion of the constitutional
provision. And so as to limitation of indebtedness.27 In all such cases the
differentiation is based upon a substantial diversity of functions, which
is accompanied by difference in powers and in organization.
§25. Differentiation and Citizenship under the Decisions of the Fed-34/Ernst Freund
eral Courts.—The conception of differentiation assumes a peculiar form
in the doctrines of the Federal courts regarding the citizenship of corpo-
rations, for purposes of jurisdiction. If the same corporators, owning
the same property and managing it as a unit through the same board of
directors, are organized under charters of two different states, it is held
that although the incorporating statute of each state contemplates, and
intends to effect, a merger and consolidation into one company, y et
there are two distinct corporations in the two states, for the law of one
state has no operation in the other. The idea of differentiation properly
understood would be inapplicable to such a case, for there is unity of
membership, of organization, of purpose, and of property; but there is
no difficulty in assuming the same corporation to constitute two entirely
separate entities, if we proceed upon the theory of a purely fictitious
personality which rests solely upon the fiat of the law and may be disso-
ciated from its natural and concrete foundations.28 As was said in Ohio
& Mississippi R. R. Co. vs. Wheeler, I Black, 286, 297: “It is true that
a corporation by the name of the plaintiff appears to have been char-
tered by the states of Indiana and Ohio, clothed with the same capacities
and powers and intended to accomplish the same objects, and it is spo-
ken of in the laws of those states as one corporate body exercising the
same powers and fulfilling the same duties in both states. Yet it has no
legal existence in either state except by the law of the state, and neither
state could confer on it a corporate existence in the other nor add or
diminish the powers to be therein exercised. It may indeed be composed
of and represent under the corporate name the same natural persons.
But the legal entity or person which exists by force of law can have no
existence beyond the limits of the state or sovereignty which brought it
into life and endues it with its faculties and powers. The President and
Directors of the O. & M. R. R. Co. are therefore a distinct and separate
body in Indiana from the corporate body of the same name in Ohio.”
It is held upon this view that, e. g., a corporation of Indiana also
incorporated in Kentucky may in Kentucky invoke the jurisdiction of
the Federal courts as being an Indiana corporation 29 It should be noted
that it is not merely asserted that the same corporation may have a double
citizenship as it may have a double domicile,—upon this view alone it
might be difficult to hold that the corporation may ignore its citizenship
in the state in which it sues or issued,—but that there are two distinct
corporations in the two states, though the property rights held in both
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maintain the jurisdiction based on adverse citizenship has been respon-
sible for some peculiar law, and the theory of fictitious and artificial
personality lends itself to any arbitrary determination of the status of
corporations that may be desired.30
§26. Identity in Succession.—The aggregate body also partakes
of the nature of its constituent elements in being affected by what I have
called the objective determination of the inherence of rights. The indi-
vidual members being primarily the representatives of an interest which
is the same for all, are in law and fact assimilated to each other; the
effect of the bond of association is, if such a term may be used, a pro-
cess of indifferentiation with respect to the members. Hence the corpo-
rate name signifies the objective element of a certain relation and not
particular individuals. Hence, also, individual members may change
without a change of title. That is to say, rights and liabilities become
vested and divested by the mere act of joining or leaving the association
and the pursuit of the common interest under it, and practically this
change is covered by the common name and by the continuity of the tie
binding remaining and incoming members together. The common law
designates this important attribute of the body corporate as perpetuity
of succession; identity in succession, i.e., in a succession of changing
members would, perhaps, be the better term. The right still belongs to a
definitely circumscribed set of persons, and the personal element is not
lost in an abstract interest such as a charitable trust represents. But the
personal reference is defined by association and not by individuality;
the holders of the right can be ascertained by following the tie of asso-
ciation which at different times may bind different individuals together.
The continuity of the personal nexus is therefore an essential feature in
determining the identity of the body corporate, while in a trust the im-
personal element of trust fund and objects furnishes the means of iden-
tification.
§27. The Resulting Conception of the Body Corporate. Departure
from Principles of Individual Right.—In this way we obtain the sa-
lient characteristics of the body corporate: its unity, its distinctiveness’
and its identity in succession; all flowing indirectly from the principle of
representative action, which qualifies and transforms the value and the
meaning of the personal factor in the holding and the exercise of rights.
It should be clearly recognized that in the principle of original represen-
tation is involved a highly important and radical difference from rules of
law commonly accepted as elementary. The law ordinarily regards the36/Ernst Freund
whole complex of rights of an individual as subject to his disposition
and as subject to the disposition of no one else; conversely this complex
is in its entirety available for the satisfaction of his liabilities, and for
those of no one else. In this latter application the significance of the rule
must be found, as a principle based upon ideas of justice and equity.
That each person should fully answer for all his acts, and should not
answer for the acts of others, is indeed a maxim of extraordinary impor-
tance, and it seems to be violated in the admission of representative
action not resting upon express delegation. Against this it can only be
urged that the maxim without modification is unjustifiable, because it
antagonizes or prevents the full protection of joint interests, which, as
we have seen, demand representation The foundation of all liability upon
principles of moral responsibility is a legal conception which may be
carried to excessive lengths; even if fully justified where liability is pe-
nal and the moral quality of the act is of the essence of its legal aspect,
it may be inadequate where it is simply a question of adjusting conflict-
ing interests in accordance with prevailing- ideas of justice and equity.
Not only therefore may this principle be modified in other directions, as,
e.g., under those systems which begin to recognize liability for accident;
but its modification with respect to the joint rights of large bodies is an
essential condition of their full and efficient recognition. Under such
extension of principles of liability a person may be affected in some
sphere of his interests as the legal consequence of acts not properly his
own, and the acts of a person may be without any effect upon interests
of his which are not under his exclusive control, although intended, and,
were they his own exclusively, sufficient, to affect them. This results
from the process of differentiation by which the acts of a person are
given effect or ignored, and their incidence is determined, with sole re-
gard to the position of that person towards a certain nexus of associa-
tion, in doing the acts in question.
§ 28. Theoretical Difficulties.—We can well understand that the rec-
ognition of a form of holding rights involving such a departure from
well-settled principles must have met with considerable difficulty. Our
ideas of a right have developed from its most common form, the coinci-
dence of control and interest in one person, as we find it in property and
liberty. It is the form of right preeminent in private law, and therefore
juristic thought is most conversant with it. It is the only form of right
which the Roman jurists fully developed, and the canons of the Roman
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the individual, private, and beneficial right is to measure and govern all
rules relating to rights of whatsoever nature, then the corporate right
will continue to be abnormal and illogical. If, on the other hand, we
emancipate ourselves from the absolute recognition of one form of right
as orthodox, if we admit that the incidents of a right may vary according
to the difference of interests for the protection of which it exists, and
according to the difference of conditions under which that protection
must operate, we may well arrive at the conclusion, that in dealing with
associations of persons we must modify the ideas which we have de-
rived from the right of property in individuals, and what has first seemed
to be an anomaly will appear simply as another but equally legitimate
form of development.
§29. Solution of the Difficulty Offered by the Organic Theory. —
The prevailing theories of corporate existence recognize what I have
called the orthodox view of the nature of the right, and must conse-
quently dispose in some way of the difficulty presented by the incidents
of collective holding. The fiction theory creates an artificial unit and
asks us to accept it in place of the required personal holder. But if the
nature of the right, for psychological and moral reasons, demands that it
be vested in a person, it is manifest that a fictitious person will not do.
The fiction theory therefore leaves the difficulty where it is. Its positive
fruit is the satisfaction of a technical requirement; and that it burdens
with the specter of an imaginary person which may claim all power and
disclaim all liability.
The attitude of those who attribute to the corporation, not a ficti-
tious, but a true and real personality of its own, is quite different. These
jurists too regard undivided personal volition as essential to the holding
of a right; they too are consequently confronted with the necessity of
finding somewhere a unity of will in the many persons associated. But
they see that we are not helped in any way by assuming a unit which we
admit at the same time to be unreal; what they offer they consequently
present as a philosophical reality. They insist that the association of
many persons produces a volition of a higher order which governs the
common right; that while this aggregate will manifests itself through
individuals, yet these individuals are merely organs of the aggregate
personality, inspired by its consciousness, its purpose, and its will. Cor-
responding to the aggregate will and consciousness there is the possibil-
ity of aggregate knowledge, ignorance, error, good and bad faith, and
wrongdoing; in other words, the elements by which we judge the nature38/Ernst Freund
of individual acts and their consequences in law, are applicable by anal-
ogy to associations of human beings. For evidence of such aggregate
personality we are referred to the existence of nations and other commu-
nities which manifest their individuality by specific types of character,
by the creation of distinctive customs and institutions, law, literature,
and language, and by the unity of their action in history.
§30. Objections to the Organic Theory.—It is quite possible to admit
the distinctive individuality of collective bodies under certain circum-
stances, without accepting it as the solution of the problem of corporate
rights. Where the connection between the persons is very close, they
may be psychologically affected to such an extent as to develop identi-
cal modes of thinking and feeling, identical phenomena of volition and
forms of action, which can be readily distinguished from the thought,
feeling, volition, and action of each taken separately, and be consequently
attributable to the aggregate as such. This will happen, where the con-
nection is physically close, where the many are assembled in one place
and under the influence of outward agencies brought to bear upon all at
the same time (“ut per multa corpora in uno loco congregata sequatur et
unica voluntas “31), so that a deliberative body, a house of legislature, a
mass meeting or a mob, may well exhibit distinctive psychological phe-
nomena somewhat analogous to those of a physical person; —or else
where the connection between the many persons lies at many points and
in many relations of life, and extends through long periods of time, so
that the constancy and variety of common influences and impressions
make up for the lack of physical closeness of association; upon this is
based the specific and distinctive nature of the nation, of communities
tied together by common blood, descent, traditions, history, language,
and common territory. But the collective holding of rights is not depen-
dent upon associations of such strongly marked cohesion. The people of
the United States have perhaps the individuality of a nation, they cer-
tainly have it to a much more marked degree than the people of the State
of New York, but as to their holding of rights both stand exactly alike,
while neither New Englanders nor Southerners as such can be parties to
any legal relation.
A family with strong elements of cohesion is without corporate will,
while a stock company without any noticeable psychological connec-
tion between the members may easily exercise common rights. Those
elements therefore which produce the impression of a distinctive aggre-
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to the collective holding of rights. Such holding should therefore not
depend upon these elements for an explanation of its possibility and its
nature. They are more valuable for sociological and psychological than
for legal purposes.
It is furthermore true that the operation of the bond of association
or its absence can be traced in many individual acts, and that we may be
able accordingly to say that under given circumstances a community as
such is guilty of an offense, that the corporation as such has notice of a
fact, or that notice has been given to individuals in such a manner that it
does not affect them as members or organs of the corporation. In such
cases it is also extremely convenient and helpful to operate with the
notion of corporate personality, and there is no danger in this as long as
we remember that the bond of association operates only upon and through
individuals placed in a certain position But the organic theory certainly
awakens and encourages the impression that this corporate personality
possesses an absolute unity and distinctiveness which if properly under-
stood would enable us to decide correctly all questions of corporate
rights and acts, to mark with certainty and exactness the limits of corpo-
rate existence, corporate representation, and corporate powers. This
certainty is quite illusory, and it is a grave objection to the organic theory
that it tends to raise a belief in it. The theory promises more than it can
perform. By tracing the psychological influence of a common bond upon
individuals we accomplish all that is in reality accomplished by the as-
sumption of a will and personality of a higher order, without dealing
with undemonstrable entities, and without being liable to unwarranted
and fallacious conclusions. It will also be shown that in most cases in
which we speak of an act or an attribute as corporate, it is not corporate
in the psychologically collective sense, but merely representative, and
imputed to the corporation for reasons of policy and convenience.
§31. The Problem of Corporate Will.—If we discard the conception
of the aggregate person as a new and distinct species of humanity, it
becomes necessary to analyze more closely ideas which are habitually
applied to corporations in analogy to the attributes of individuals, such
as corporate will, corporate acting capacity, etc.
And first as to corporate will. In its simplest and most obvious mean-
ing this is the personal will of the associates acting under the bond of
association. This will is the product of mutual personal influence and of
the influence of a common purpose, frequently also the result of com-
promise and submission. Where under the operation of these factors we40/Ernst Freund
obtain a unanimous resolution, we may clearly speak of corporate will.
But we are also justified in assuming a correct expression of corporate
will, where of the associated persons only a portion, representative in
numbers, character, and position, act habitually, while the rest sustain a
relation of acquiescence, dependence, or incapacity. A unanimous ex-
pression of the adult male members of a political community may there-
fore be accepted as embodying the aggregate will.
It may even be urged that where a majority is clearly guided by the
common interest, while the position of the minority is dictated by the
expectation of adverse individual benefit, the corporate will is repre-
sented by the majority act as springing from motives which should in
reason prompt and determine all the members, while the dissenting mem-
bers place themselves beyond the corporate bond and do not disturb the
psychological correctness of the aggregate conclusion. This view must
necessarily be taken, where corporation and member are opposed to
each other as adverse parties, either in matters of internal government,
or in contract or tort. The adverse interest of the member precludes him
from representing the corporate will.32
The situation is different where both majority and minority repre-
sent corporate interests, and it is simply a question of judgment and
expediency, which of two or more courses shall be adopted. The true
corporate will would be expressed by unanimous action resulting from
common deliberation and mutual compromise and submission; but for
purposes of convenience the law stops the process of reaching this con-
clusion halfway, and is satisfied with the concurrence of the greater
portion of those acting. The justification of this legal expedient lies in
the fact that the will of the majority may be presumed to express cor-
rectly what would be the result of forced unanimity; a presumption not
always agreeable to fact, but convenient and more practicable than any
other. A similar and even stronger presumption operates in favor of the
will of the quorum against those voluntarily abstaining from action. In
so far as the presumption fails to be correct, it cannot be denied that a
will which is not identical with the corporate will is imputed to the cor-
poration, just as we impute the will of the agent to the principal without
insisting that it should in all cases accord with the principal’s will. The
same view must be taken of the acts of other corporate organs; they may
likewise be presumed to voice correctly the corporate will, but their will
is not the corporate will strictly speaking. There too the imputation of
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largely determined by the operation of the bond of association upon his
mind, because the consciousness of personal influence and responsibil-
ity is similar to that working upon the associates. The policy of the law
results, however, in the substitution of a will presumptively according
with the corporate will for the will which is actually and undoubtedly
corporate.
There is some ground for arguing that the correct expression of
corporate will depends upon joint meeting and deliberation of the asso-
ciates. On the other hand, it is certain that the presumption of accor-
dance with corporate will is as strong where all the associates act sepa-
rately, as where only a portion act jointly. It is, however, a well settled
rule, that while official boards which exercise powers collectively may
act by quorum and majority, they must act in joint meeting.33 Evidently
this rule aims to secure an additional guaranty that expressed shall be
truly corporate, while actual concurrence of all members is waived in
the interest of the more expeditious transaction of public business. Where
the public will is expressed by ballot each citizen acts separately; but
the constant contact between members of a political community is a
sufficient substitute for joint meeting. Where the members of a corpora-
tion are the sole and ultimate parties in interest, their unanimous sepa-
rate action is substantially equivalent to corporate action. As was said
in the case of the People vs. North River Sugar Refining Company, 121
N.Y., 582, p. 619, “There may be actual corporate conduct which is not
formal corporate action, and where that conduct is directed and pro-
duced by the whole body, both of officers and stockholders, by every
living instrumentality which can possess and wield the corporate fran-
chise, that conduct is of corporate character.”34 In equity the corpora-
tion can often be practically bound by the aid of the doctrine of estoppel
or by recognizing equitable as against legal rights.35 Where legal re-
quirements as to manner of action are disregarded, a formal defect will
undoubtedly result, and the act may be void. The cases which refuse to
regard all the shareholders (or the individual holding all the stock) as
identical with the corporation, mean simply that where rights are held
under corporate organization, the law will insist upon all legal acts be-
ing done in the corporate name and not in the name of individual mem-
bers.36 This is sound legal policy, for the security of transactions would
be seriously impaired if a legally established name could be disregarded
ad libitum.
§32. Corporate Acting Capacity.—Closely connected with the ques-42/Ernst Freund
tion of corporate will is that of acting capacity. An act to be recognized
as truly corporate should unmistakably bearthe impress of collective
will and impulse. In this sense truly corporate is the act of acclamation,
a form of action which can be used only for simple declarations (elec-
tions, approval, etc.). It would be difficult to imagine another act as
specifically corporate and collective as this; the nearest equivalent is an
act done by all the members acting as nearly together as possible in
place and in time.37 It is clear that if we restrict corporate acts to this,
the range of corporate acting capacity must be extremely limited; for an
act of delivery by any considerable number of persons must be a physi-
cal impossibility.
But it is not necessary to take such a narrow view, for only in the
fewest cases is it necessary that a person’s legal act should also be his
physical act. It is usually sufficient that the act should be set in motion
directly by his will, no matter whose physical organs are used.38 There
seems to be no reason why the same liberal view should not be applied
to the acts of corpo rations. There are indeed some acts the nature of
which seems to exclude the idea of vicarious performance. Of this char-
acter is perhaps an oath; for it may be urged that the sense of sol emnity
and responsibility is lost if it is not taken directly by the person whose
conscience is sought to be bound. There are some crimes to which simi-
lar observations apply, and as a rule it will be impossible to establish
with clearness the psychological con. nection between the criminal in-
tent of the physical perpetrator of the criminal act and the will of a body
of persons; for criminal intent is usually not manifested by formal and
deliberate declarations. The idea of a collective crime appears, however
in the law regarding mobs and conspiracies.
On principle it should be said that every act is a corporate act which
is directly induced by an expression of true corporate will, as, e.g., by
an unanimous resolution. Understood in this liberal sense corporate act-
ing capacity is coextensive with the possibility of corporate will. As a
matter of fact, however, courts have rarely to deal with acts which are
even in this liberal sense corporate. What proclaims itself as a corporate
act is nearly always an act based upon representative will, i.e., an act
induced by a will which is imputed to the corporation on account of
presumptive and probable identity and accordance with what would be
actual corporate will. Representative will naturally produces only rep-
resentative action, and the law does not require more than that in order
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have in mind the possibility to be represented in action and not the mere
capacity to give effect to corporate will, and a corporate act therefore
becomes simply an act dictated by proper corporate representation.
§33. Representative Action and Organization.—Of the two methods
of representative . action, original representation, i.e., the act of the
quorum or of a majority, can directly produce at most a declaration of
will; for all more complicated acts, even for the execution of instru-
ments, individual agency becomes necessary. For the vast majority of
its legal acts the corporation must therefore depend upon the additional
aid of delegated representation; and the delegation of powers, which is
the chief purpose of organization, is therefore the regular basis of cor-
porate acting capacity.
The organization of the body corporate, which distributes different
functions among different organs, constitutes an advance upon inherent
and natural modes of representation. It may even depart from them di-
rectly, in so far as powers may be delegated to persons who are not
associates, the express delegation standing in stead of a share in the
original right. When distinct organs have been created, it is not neces-
sary in each case to ask whether the personal nexus of the association is
apparent in the act of those acting on behalf of the corporation, so as to
make their action representative. It follows from this mode of represen-
tation, that a person who is especially entrusted with a set of functions
will be apt to assume a habit of mind which is most appropriate for the
exercise of these functions in the corporate interest, and the law strength-
ens this advantage by forbidding him to take a position adverse to his
trust. It is also possible through proper organization to give separate
expression to separate interests of the same body, and thus to produce a
proper balance and adjustment of the conflict of purposes which may
arise in an association of many spheres of action. This constitutes the
great value of organization in public law, as a means of protecting pri-
vate rights against governmental action through the machinery of the
government itself.
While organization thus bestows upon the corporation great facili-
ties for action, it carries corresponding burdens. As the corporation must
constantly claim the benefit of acts done by its organs, it cannot fail to
be charged with their acts done in its apparent interest and with the aid
of resources placed in their hands. It is inevitable that representative
acting capacity should appear to the popular mind as coextensive with
the possibilities of corporate will.44/Ernst Freund
§34. The Governing Body.—It is in accordance with this view that in
every corporation there is commonly recognized some one organ as hold-
ing what we may call residuary powers, whose acts are taken as prima
facie representative within the whole range of corporate acting capac-
ity. Where the body is accustomed to act directly by original representa-
tion, this organ may be found in the quorum and the majority; in most
cases, however, it will be a delegated organ, itself consisting of a num-
ber of persons, and designated as governing board or body. Of this na-
ture is the managing board of directors or trustees in a private, the leg-
islative body or bodies in a public, corporation.
The plan of organization not unfrequently provides that the whole
of the corporate powers shall be vested in the governing body or board.
An interesting question then arises as to the relation between this body
and the members at large of the corporation: is the relation that of agent
and principal or not? Both views have found judicial support. It has
been held on the one side that the directors are the primary possessors of
all the powers which the charter confers; that since in the board of direc-
tors is vested every power, faculty or function which belongs to the
body they represent, there can be no question in the law of agency;39 on
the other side it has been said that the directors are the mere representa-
tives of the corporators, the latter constituting the corporation.40 In fa-
vor of the latter view it may be said that the directors are elected by the
members and that the election constitutes a delegation of powers; in
favor of the former that, since the organization is generally prescribed
by law, the election is only the designation of those organs in corporate
powers.
But whether we hold the corporate powers to be delegated by the
corporators or to be vested by law, the position of the governing body
must be different from that of mere agents. While the agent’s authority
can as a rule be revoked by the principal at any time, the authority of the
governing body cannot be superseded by majority resolutions.41 This
follows, however, from the general nature of corporate acting capacity
The majority will is only presumptively identical with the corporate
will, and a similar presumption exists in favor of the will of the govern-
ing body. It is the proper function of the plan of organization to decide
between the two presumptions if they conflict; and by vesting the corpo-
rate powers in the governing body for a definite time it sets the will of
the latter above that of fluctuating majorities. Logically, however, the
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the real should prevail over the presumptive corporate will. The treat-
ment of irregular acts of the governing body as merely voidable, and the
possibility of their ratification by unanimous consent or acquiescence,
must be based upon a view of the relations between governing body and
corporators analogous to that between agent and principal.
Where the whole sum of corporate powers is vested by law directly
in a board of directors or trustees,—leaving to the members nothing but
a right of election,—it may be very plausibly urged that the corporate
rights are held substantially as a trust for the corporators, who then
appear simply as beneficiaries. The problem of corporate capacity would
thereby be shifted from the members at large to the governing body,
which holds and exercises its trust upon the collective principle, by origi-
nal and delegated representation. Such an organization whom the law
itself vests the entirety of reduces the personal cohesion between the
corporators to a minimum, and allows us to see in a large railroad,
banking or insurance corporation rather an aggregation of capital than
an association of persons. Still there is this distinction from a pure trust,
that the holding of a right in which the parties in interest elect those who
exercise the control, furnishes a higher degree of protection to the joint
interest; and this the law recognizes by vesting the title in the members
collectively. Through frequent elections a very substantial measure of
indirect control can be secured to the members, even where the whole of
the corporate powers is vested in the governing board. It is true that a
trust can be organized for the protection of joint interests in such a
manner that the parties in interest elect the trustees; in that case the
distinction from corporate organization in which the governing body
holds all corporate powers is merely nominal and technical. Such an
arrangement is apt to be adopted where there are difficulties in the way
of corporate organization; otherwise the creation of a trust is more ap-
propriate where the beneficiaries are incapable of acting or are not in-
tended to have a vested interest in the corporate funds; so where prop-
erty is held for charitable purposes. It should also be observed that where
the law vests the corporate powers in a board of directors, this has been
construed in some jurisdictions to refer only to ordinary acts of manage-
ment, so that the exercise of exceptional powers is reserved by implica-
tion to the body of the corporators;42 this of course is likewise based
upon the view that the members at large are the true and ultimate hold-
ers of the corporate rights.
§35. Representation in Fact and in Law.—Some of the most difficult46/Ernst Freund
questions regarding corporate capacity, notably those concerning the
treatment of ultra vires and wrongful acts, arise from conflicting claims
as to representation. It is impossible to form a clear conception of the
nature of these difficulties, unless we distinguish between the psycho-
logical and the legal aspect of representation The fact that a corporation
acts habitually by representation must operate to its detriment as well as
to its benefit. The creation of representative functions will inevitably
convey to those dealing with the corporation the idea of representative
position and power, corresponding to such functions and commensurate
with the whole range of collective acting capacity; the corporation will
be popularly held to possess organs for the performance of all acts which
it might conceivably authorize. If the psychological possibilities of the
bond of association are allowed full scope, the domain of corporate will
is coextensive with the domain of possible corporate interest, and there-
fore may easily expand beyond the original purposes of association. Its
only intrinsic limit is the consciousness of collective ends and purposes;
for the continuing operation of the personal nexus depends upon some
ostensible reference of corporate resources to the joint interests of all
members. But while corporate action must manifest a possible tendency
to inure in some degree to the benefit of each member, such benefit may
easily be offset by a much greater injury to the member’s individual
non-corporate interests. The danger of such conflict is inseparable from
any association. In joining an association the members will therefore
stipulate for a limitation of purposes, beyond which the risk of such
conflict is not to be incurred. But the psychological possibility of corpo-
rate action is not thereby destroyed; it becomes simply a question be-
tween usurped corporate power and invaded individual right, which may
be variously decided. The actual power and the legal right of represen-
tation may thus go very far apart; the reality of aggregate conditions
involves the possibility of their asserting themselves in the face of legal
restrictions.
§36. Ultra Vires Acts.—We speak of “ultra vires” where a corporation
acts beyond the limits of the powers established by its constitution as
embodied in charter or articles of association or general law. They are
not merely irregular in form or done by unauthorized organs, but acts
which the corporation could not legally do in any manner without hav-
ing first.its constituent act changed. Such an act may constitute a viola-
tion of other rights in two different directions; as against the associates
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state it is the breach of a limitation imposed upon the body corporate as
a prerequisite to its legal recognition. There is thus a double barrier
opposed to the legality of these acts, and one may stand even where the
other is removed by waiver, consent, or ratification.
There is considerable lack of principle and consistency in the judi-
cial treatment of these acts, and this is probably due to faulty views of
the nature of corporate acting capacity. If we regard the principle of
representation purely as a creature of the law, having no possible exist-
ence apart from legal recognition, there is no escape from the conclu-
sion that all corporate acting capacity involving that principle must be
strictly bound within legal limits, which, in the nature of things, it can-
not exceed. An ultra vires act cannot, therefore, possibly be a corporate
act, and a corporate act cannot be an ultra vires act; the two ideas
involve a contradictio in adjecto. Upon this basis we must take one of
two alternative positions:
Either we hold that the law by the creation of the corporation be-
stows upon it the fullest acting capacity, while at the same time it for-
bids its use beyond the limits of the charter powers. This is a possible
and a workable theory; it is supported by some writers as the “general
capacity” doctrine. If we accept it, every act done by corporate authori-
ties in the corporate name is a corporate act by legal creation and legal
sanction. It is perhaps not impossible that such an act should at the
same time be wrongful, illegal, and even voidable, but it does seem
illogical to treat it as void. For if it is void, the law creates only in order
to deny its creation, it gives with one hand and takes with the other. A
void corporate act, which, in order to be a Corporate act, must first
have been called into existence by the fiat of the law, is necessarily an
anomaly. The fiction theory and the general-capacity doctrine thus be-
come irreconcilable, unless we are ready to admit that no corporate act,
however much beyond the corporate purposes, should ever be treated as
void. But this admission would find no support in the decisions of the
courts.
Or, arguing still on the basis of the fiction theory, we may hold that
the law confers acting capacity only to a limited extent, as an aid and
instrument to the accomplishment of the charter purposes. Upon this
view every act beyond the corporate powers is simply the act of physi-
cal persons attempting to attach to the corporation rights or liabilities
which it has not acquired or assumed. This, on the whole, is the more
plausible view under the fiction theory, and logically it should dispose48/Ernst Freund
of ultra vires acts by denying their possibility. It is, however, well known
that practically no such simple solution of the problem is possible, and
that persistently ultra vires acts enforce their recognition as corporate
acts.
§37. Ultra Vires Acts as Corporate Acts.—But if we regard corpo-
rate acting capacity as the expression of the principle of representation,
and the principle of representation as the product of associated action,
irrespective of law, then it follows that the law by recognizing the cor-
poration as such does not create its acting capacity, but merely admits
the natural effect of the collective holding of rights together with its
inevitable incidents. The recognition of an ultra vires act as a corporate
act, therefore, does not involve a logical inconsistency, nor does it pre-
judge the question of its legality or validity. This view leads to a distinc-
tion between corporate acting capacity and corporate powers or legal
capacity, and while we may admit the former to the fullest extent, we
may yet hold that the law in recognizing a corporation grants to it only
the powers required for the accomplishment of its charter purposes.
Where, therefore, an act is done in the corporate name, but beyond
the corporate powers, it should first be determined whether the act can
morally or psychologically be attributed to the body corporate as truly
representative in character. The test must be twofold: first, is the act
done in the corporate interest, i.e., for the real or plausible advancement
of common purposes? and second: is it done by organs whose position is
for the doing of this kind of acts representative? It would be probably
difficult to discover any ultra vires act with which the courts ever had to
deal, which was not corporate upon both the tests advanced, because
without their presence as a justification it would probably not be at-
tempted to fasten an act upon a corporation. If a railroad company runs
a steam boat,43 if a manufacturing company builds houses and rents
them to its employees, if a business corporation subscribes money to
secure the location of a public building near its premises,44 even where
a railroad company guarantees the expenses of a musical festival which
promises to attract many visitors to a city,45 the common interest is
obvious. Take the extreme case of a city running a distillery.46 A mu-
nicipal corporation is organized for government, but incidental to gov-
ernment is the possession of property, and the possession of property
requires its profitable use and investment. What shall constitute a proper
investment— loan on security, holding of real estate, or industrial enter-
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is not properly investment, it may be answered that the foreclosure of a
mortgage may lead to it as a practical necessity. If, however, such con-
nection with common purposes cannot be established, the act cannot be
called corporate in any sense: so if a bank cashier should pay an indi-
vidual debt with moneys belonging to the bank, it would be simply a
conversion of cor porate funds, and no one would speak of an ultra
vires act. And so the ultra vires act, in order to be corporate, must be
done by an officer whose position for that purpose is representative; if a
freight agent had guaranteed the expenses of a musical festival, his act
would never have been attempted to be imputed to the railroad com-
pany, but the act of a freight agent in taking goods for transportation
beyond the line of his company, though it may be ultra vires, may yet be
corporate. As a rule, however, ultra vires acts must be either done or
authorized by governing boards, or general managing officers, whose
acts, upon principles above set forth, are prima facie representative.
§38. Treatment of Ultra Vires Acts.—The recognition of an ultra vires
act as corporate is quite consistent with the view that it is an act which
is illegal as violating shareholders’ rights or legal restrictions or both.
Upon the ground of mere illegality, however, different methods of legal
treatment are possible.
First: an illegal act may in law be treated as void, i.e., it may be
deprived of its intended effect. This is especially possible where the act,
in order to be effectual, requires legal enforcement, of which a broken
executory contract is the typical example. Any unconsummated act, the
consummation of which can be prevented by judicial decree, as, e.g., a
resolution, an order, or any documentary declaration, stands upon the
same footing. If such an act is void, a defense raised by anybody, or an
appropriate action brought bv anyone having an actionable interest, will
result in a judicial declaration of nullity, which, however, adds nothing
to the legal nullity of the act. If the act is executed and consummated by
transfer of possession or otherwise, the legal view may still on principle
be the same, there may be complete failure of title or failure of consid-
eration, but the law cannot prevent actual conditions from having their
natural effect, and the result must be in many cases confusion or injus-
tice or both. Such a state of facts may then again be counteracted by
appropriate remedies, the purpose of which will be to restore the parties
to their equitable rights. “The courts, while refusing to maintain any
action upon the unlawful contract, have always striven to do justice
between the parties, so far as it could be done consistently with adher-50/Ernst Freund
ence to law, by permitting property or money parted with on the faith of
the unlawful contract to be recovered back, or compensation to be made
for it.”47
Second: The law may treat the ultra vires act as simply wrongful
and not as void. In purely executory acts the result will often be the
same, since the prevention of a wrongful act or a successful defense to it
while in this stage, will leave it altogether without effect. There will be
this difference, however, that the wrongfulness could not be taken ad-
vantage of by parties whose rights are not violated. Where therefore the
performance of an ultra vires contract is successfully resisted either by
the corporation making it or by the other contracting party, it is clear
that the contract is treated as void and not as simply wrongful. Where,
however, ultra vires acts are fully executed, the law in most cases prac-
tically proceeds upon the view that the act is merely wrongful. This may
still give to the aggrieved party a right in equity to demand rescission or
cancellation or an injunction restraining the enjoyment of the rights held
wrongfully, or it may result in the recognition of the ultra vires act as
having its full intended effect, throwing the aggrieved party back upon
other remedies. So the injured corporation may sue the directors for
damages, and above all the state may institute proceedings against the
corporation violating its charter for a forfeiture of its franchises or for
its dissolution, proceedings which cannot effect a confiscation of the
beneficial interest in the fruits of the ultra vires acts. Such proceedings
are of course based upon the theory that the acts complained of, while
ultra vires and illegal, must be attributed to the corporation.
Whether ultra vires acts shall be treated as void or as wrongful, is a
question of legal policy, which is not affected by any theory of corporate
existence. It is simply a part of the larger question how, in general, acts
beyond legal power or violating legal prohibitions shall be dealt with—
one of the most difficult and unsettled legal problems. The position of
the law may vary according as the act is simply beyond the charter
power, or also against public policy, immoral, or expressly prohibited,
also according as the corporation is public or private. The decision there-
fore turns on other points than the nature of corporate acting capacity.
§39. Corporate Torts.—If corporate acting capacity is purely a gift of
the law, it is as difficult to understand a corporate tort as a corporate
ultra vires act. A practical distinction is made between the two, since
corporations are now held very generally liable on tort. Torts are there-
fore treated as corporate acts. Upon the view of corporate acting capac-The Legal Nature of the Corporations/51
ity here taken this is the natural treatment. The wrongful exercise of
powers is as much an incident to the collective holding of rights as the
exercise of powers not granted by the constituent act. The tort like the
ultra vires act is an illegal corporate act, but the determination of its
consequences does not present the same difficulties. To treat it as a void
act would be as inadmissible as it would be to treat individual torts as
void. The policy of the law demands imperatively that the injured party
be given redress in damages. For this different treatment of torts and
ultra vires acts the reason is given, that in an ultra vires contract the
other party, having actual or constructive knowledge of the charter limi-
tations, is particeps criminis in consenting to their violation, while the
tort acts upon the injured party without his privily and consent. Another
reason is, that the ultra vires act is done to produce legal consequences,
and therefore contemplates a widening of the sphere of corporate activ-
ity, while the tort, being merely an incident to the exercise of valid pow-
ers, has no such. tendency or effect. To treat the tort as void would
therefore leave the hardship inflicted upon the injured party without any
justification, the plea of public policy being unavailable.
The only remaining question would be: can the liability be justified
as against members of the corporation who have not been parties to the
act? Where is the moral nexus between tort and responsibility, which we
usually find in individual tort? Cases can undoubtedly be imagined where
we might speak strictly of a corporate wrong, so where a libelous reso-
lution should be unanimously passed, or where another unlawful act
could be traced to a clear intent and active prompting on the part of the
members.48 But these are not the torts upon which the courts have estab-
lished the theory of corporate liability. A corporate tort is generally the
immediate act of an officer or employee of the corporation. In some
cases it can be traced to the direction, authorization, adoption, or ap-
proval of the governing board, while in others no such connection can
be established. Where such connection exists; it is very usual to say that
the tort is the act of the corporation. In other words the corporation is
identified with its governing body, according to a very general and very
strong sentiment, that the corporation should be held to be fully repre-
sented by the organs to which the general management of its affairs is
entrusted. In reality the wrong here rests, not on corporate, but on rep-
resentative action. The idea of representative wrong once admitted, it
naturally extends to each other agent of the corporation, with this quali-
fication, that the representative position of the officer or employee ex-52/Ernst Freund
tends only to certain functions, and that his power to do representative
wrong is correspondingly limited. Unless the tortious act of an employee
is part of a general bad system of corporate management, we hardly
regard it as the wrong of the corporation, because we are not apt to
identify the corporation with every one of its organs. But whether the
tort is committed by the governing board or by another agent, the liabil-
ity is equally based upon representative action. The case is quite analo-
gous to the liability of the principal for the tort of his agent. In order to
establish the desired moral nexus between act and responsibility, it is
sometimes said that the liability is based upon negligence in selecting
organs and employees,—a charge which would generally be incapable
of substantiation. The real moral principle involved in corporate liabil-
ity for tort is, that the risk and burden of acts incidental to an enterprise
should fall upon those who benefit by the enterprise. It thus appears that
the whole doctrine of corporate tort, like that of corporate acting capac-
ity in general, must be based upon the idea of representation. If correct,
it applies to public as well as private corporations, although the former
for reasons of public policy may be exempt from liability.
Because the corporate liability for tort does not rest upon actual
collective or corporate moral wrong, it cannot be used to establish the
possibility of corporate crime. In so far as a crime is nothing but a tort
against the public, as in case of the non-compliance with a statutory
regulation or the maintenance of a nuisance, there is of course no reason
why an indictment should not lie against a corporation. But in so far as
crime involves moral delinquency or turpitude, the idea of representa-
tion would run counter to the principle, that moral responsibility must
be direct and admits of no shifting. The same principle appears in the
system of criminal penalties. A corporate crime should therefore be based
upon collective wrong, and be admitted only where the latter can be
established. In former times, collective wrong was perhaps more easily
assumed than now. If a community was excommunicated or deprived of
franchises, the idea of a collective and mutual moral responsibility was
probably accepted by those who inflicted as well as by those who suf-
fered the penalty.
At present the collective moral responsibility of persons associated
is a matter of political rather than of legal cognizance The grant of self-
governmental powers to a community both presupposes such responsi-
bility and is apt to create it. The right to associate for any purpose may
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may also take into consideration the fact that large associations tend to
diminish the sense of individual responsibility in each member, and be
guided by this view in the treatment of corporations; but this, so far
from being a denial, is rather an implied recognition of collective moral
qualities.
§40. Corporate Opinion and its Expression.—The expression of a
collective opinion by an association of persons is likewise not apt to
become a matter of legal cognizance, but is of intrinsic interest as throw-
ing light upon the capacity of aggregate bodies. Opinion and judgment
are attributes of the individual mind, which, however, can be influenced
by association. In a small body opinions may be so much modified by
common deliberation and exchange of ideas, that the result may bear the
impress of collective thought. The judgments of an appellate court may
serve as an instance in point. In large aggregations of people we like-
wise discern mutual influences in bringing about homogeneous views,
and we then speak of public opinion. The expression of opinion is, how-
ever, a matter of volition as much as of intellect, and may become the
act of the body on principles of representation, if it is put forward as
such. The impression of unity which is created by people associated
with each other for common purposes, may easily lead others to charge
them with collective opinions, which will be attributed to the body not-
withstanding the dissent of individual members. In this as in other mat-
ters the collective capacity is by no means limited to definite purposes,
and it may happen that a political opinion may be advanced and ac-
cepted as the opinion of a scientific or religious body. Expressions of
opinion, unless they assume the character of a libel or of a fraudulent
representation, are legally irrelevant and therefore form no part of the
law of corporations under our system. In France, however, it may hap-
pen that the action of a local body expressing an opinion on matters of
general policy is quashed by the central government as illegal and in
excess of jurisdiction, or that the body is dissolved in consequence. Simi-
lar principles are recognized in Germany. And if our courts of equity
continue to extend their jurisdiction in granting injunctions as they have
extended it heretofore, we may yet see the day when an association will
be restrained at the suit of a member from passing resolutions of sympa-
thy or of condemnation on the ground of their being ultra vires.
§41. Service of Process: Corporate Notice and Corporate Resi-
dence.—Of greater practical importance, though of less intrinsic inter-
est, is the question of the possibility of corporate notice. This becomes54/Ernst Freund
relevant in the service of process, one important object of process being
to communicate information to the party to whom it is issued. As corpo-
rations generally act through delegated organs, notice given to such or-
gans-binds by representation the body at large, which may remain igno-
rant of the proceedings. It is however recognized by legislative policy as
well as by the courts, that the organs to whom notice is to be given
should be really representative, so that their knowledge may be justly
regarded as inuring to the benefit of the common interest; the chief or
managing officers are usually designated for that purpose. Irrespective
of statutory provision, notice to a mere member car. certainly not be
regarded as notice to the corporation, not only because the member as
such is clearly distinguished from the corporation, but because, where
he has no active functions, he represents only his share in the common
interest, and in no sense the whole of it. If a statute provides for service
upon a stockholder of a foreign corporation in the absence of any man-
aging officers who could be served within the state, this can be upheld,
if at all, only upon the theory that the law constitutes each stockholder
for that purpose a corporate officer, and makes the acceptance of such
provision a condition precedent to allowing the corporation to do busi-
ness within the state; but it must be doubted whether any effect would
be given to such notice outside of the state or whether it can be justified
on principle.49 Notice to all the members would as a matter of fact and
of equity stand on an entirely different footing. But where the statute
demands service on officers, no other mode of service will be legal,
since provisions regarding service of process are always stricti juris
and must be complied with in every particular in order to confer juris-
diction.
The service of process on foreign corporations involves not only the
question of notice, but also that of presence within the state. The object
of the summons is partly indeed to communicate information of legal
proceedings, partly however also to establish jurisdiction over the per-
son of the defendant. It may be stated as a principle of general jurispru-
dence, that a personal liability cannot be created by judgment unless the
defendant has been brought personally under the jurisdiction of the court
rendering the judgment.50 A non-resident must either voluntarily submit
to such jurisdiction, or process must be served upon him within the
state. Considerable difficulty was felt in this respect with regard to for-
eign corporations. A corporation is regarded as having its legal domi-
cile within the state of its creation; there it is subject to the jurisdictionThe Legal Nature of the Corporations/55
of the courts in such a manner, that a judgment against it will be avail-
able everywhere. But how could such a “personal” liability ever be fas-
tened upon a foreign corporation, which, as a fictitious entity, could not
migrate and therefore never be brought within domestic jurisdiction?
Gradually, while the theory itself was not shaken, it came to be recog-
nized that by another fiction a corporation might be “found” where it
was doing business,51 and that it could be compelled as a condition of its
being allowed to do business in another state to consent to be served
there through the persons of its officers, and even to appoint agents for
that purpose.52 The fiction of unalterable domicile was supplemented by
the fiction of voluntary submission.
If we abandon the idea of fictitious existence, it is quite clear that a
corporation may have a domicile or residence like an individual. These
are primarily legal conceptions, and do not mean so much physical pres-
ence as the central location of certain interests, and the place in and
from which a certain activity is carried on. As an individual may reside
in New York and from there administer his affairs throughout the coun-
try, so also a corporation. A corporation may also change its domicile,
and can migrate in fact if not in law. It is well known that the domicile
within the state of the creation has in many cases become a fiction in
fraud of the law, and the substitution of a sound theory would be ex-
tremely desirable. If sometimes a doubt may exist as to the real domicile
of a corporation, such doubt may equally occur in a case of an indi-
vidual.
The question of physical presence, irrespective of domicile, stands
indeed upon a different footing. Where the members of a corporation
are scattered, it would be impossible to determine the actual collective
location of the body. Here again we must have recourse to the principle
of representation. We are not only justified in regarding the physical
location of the governing body as that of the corporation, but as the
corporation acts chiefly through delegated organs, it should be held to
the burdens as well as the benefits of this liberal recognition of repre-
sentative action. In other words, the presence of corporate organs in a
representative capacity should be imputed to the corporation itself, with
the result that the corporation, so far from being incapable of being
outside of its domicile, can be in several places and jurisdictions at the
same time.53 It would therefore not seem to be necessary on principle,
that the corporation should keep a place of business in another state, to
be capable of being served with process there;54 the transaction of some56/Ernst Freund
business through an officer acting within the jurisdiction of that state
should be sufficient.55 It would be neither harsh nor unreasonable to
hold that a railroad company enters the state whenever it runs a train
through its territory, and that it is then represented by the employee
having charge of the train.56 But the New York courts seem to stand
alone in holding that a corporation can be served in the person of an
officer who enters the state in a private capacity and not on corporate
business.57 This goes beyond the sound doctrine of representation, and a
judgment rendered upon such service would probably not be recognized
as having extra-territorial effect.58
The development of the law with regard to service of process on
corporations illustrates the gradually increasing recognition of the doc-
trine of representation. The common law considered personal service on
the intangible body impossible, only its property could be attached.59
Then the governing officers of the corporation at the seat of its domicile
were identified with it for the purpose of service. Then it became recog-
nized that even outside the jurisdiction of its creation the corporation
can be held to be fully represented by its officers, but these officers must
be principal officers or general or managing officers “whose knowledge
would be that of the corporation”60 (it might have been said instead:
jurisdiction over whose person is jurisdiction over the corporation it-
self). It only remains to take the further step and hold that the corpora-
tion should also be held to be represented by the principal officer, no
matter whether general manager or not, through whom it acts in a for-
eign jurisdiction in which it has property or does business, for this is
required by justice and convenience, and the idea of personal jurisdic-
tion must in all cases alike rest upon the principle of representation.
§42. Corporate Capacity and Representation.—The foregoing analy-
sis of corporate will and acting capacity should have established two
points: first, that an association of persons is capable of producing dis-
tinct aggregate conditions with corresponding psychological and practi-
cal effects; and second, that the corporate acts and conditions with which
the law has generally to deal are not really corporate, but representa-
tive. The aggregate conditions, however, not only necessitate and justify
representation, but they also act upon it through the psychological in-
fluence of a personal nexus. There is consequently a fair presumption
that the representative act truly reflects what would be the corporate
will; but the law neither demands the existence of a distinct corporate
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thus appears how far we must cut down the notion of an aggregate
personality, if we would wish to avoid all mystical conceptions’ and
limit ourselves to tangible and demonstrable facts. When we speak of
corporate acts, or corporate tort, or corporate notice, we mean in nearly
every case representative acts, torts, or notice, and only the rights and
liabilities produced thereby are really and distinctively collective.
That the psychological influence of the collective body standing
back of the representative organ is a powerful reality and not a fiction,
is a truth which is more apt to impress itself upon the student of political
institutions than upon the lawyer. Our governmental organization is very
largely based upon the expectation of different action on the part of
local, state, and national organs, though the personnel for either system
must be drawn from the same sources. The different character of the
federal and state courts is well known, but it cannot be a difference of
personal origin, character or training, since the judges for both sets of
courts are drawn from the same local bodies of lawyers, and it probably
does not rest nearly so much upon the different tenure of office as upon
the consciousness that they respectively represent different bodies poli-
tic. The same is generally true in private corporations. But it is obvious,
that if courts have to determine the validity and effect of certain acts,
these subtle and intangible influences cannot as a rule be ascertained, or
taken into consideration. Therefore the moral capacity of the aggregate
body is generally speaking for strictly legal purposes an irrelevant fac-
tor, and it is misleading to assert that every corporate act is the manifes-
tation of corporate will and therefore of corporate personality. By aban-
doning the strained view of the corporation as a real person, we forego
the advantage of basing the acts by which collective rights are exercised
upon an undivided corporate will. The idea of a corporate, as of any
other right is said to demand the constant operation of such a will. But
the nature of the right can require nothing that is contrary to the purpose
of a right; if the purpose of the right is the protection of joint interests; if
divided action would destroy the joint interests, and undivided action
demands that some should yield to others; if concurrent action of all,
parties in interest is impracticable, and delegation offers itself as a solu-
tion of the difficulty; then it is a practical requirement of the collective
holding of rights that some may act for all; the principles upon which
individual rights are exercised, must be modified when rights are vested
in an association; the principle of the coincidence of discretion and re-
sponsibility, of act and liability, must yield to the principle of represen-58/Ernst Freund
tation.
§43. Real Nature of Corporate Unity.—Instead of seeking for an un-
attainable metaphysical unity, it is far better to inquire in what sense
and to what extent the generally accepted idea of the unity of the asso-
ciation as a holder of rights is justified. The truth is that the conception
of unity is derived from the operation of undivided control in the asso-
ciation, which in its turn is made possible by the influence of the per-
sonal nexus upon the members. The association becomes visible and
active in and through individuals only, but the common purpose, the
concerted action, and the combined resources, produce upon our mind
the impression, that the association itself enjoys something like the power
of individual personal agency.
The resulting conception is not one of absolute unity, such as the
German jurists demand, and as to them appears realized in the indi-
vidual will, but a relative unity, which after all is the most that we can
hope to establish. Just as it is impossible to define the meaning of a
physical thing as distinct from other things otherwise than by an act of
mental arbitrament, which determines that there is a sufficient connec-
tion between parts, either physical or by reference to some human pur-
pose, to justify the idea of unity, so there is no absolute objective test by
which we could be forced to allow or deny the character of unity to an
aggregate body of human persons. The analogy of composite things
explains perfectly the nature of the association. If we treat a house, a
ship, a forest, or a mine, as one thing, we do not deny that this thing is
composed of many separate or severable parts, each of which may be a
thing by itself. But in so far as the connection is operative, the part has
no legal existence except as a part, and does not form an object of sepa-
rate legal disposition; it shares the legal status of the composite thing,
while as soon as the nexus is broken or only disregarded, it becomes a
subject of independent treatment in law.
In like manner we treat the association as one, disregarding the sepa-
rate existence of its members as individuals, in so far as their recogni-
tion as such would make the protection of joint interests an impossibil-
ity, i.e., in so far as it would disturb the conditions of undivided control.
If it is objected that this does not amount to true unity, the answer will
be that such a unity as the objection contemplates, is not claimed, that if
we adopt the strictest point of view, the unity becomes in one sense a
fiction, in that sense, namely, in which the neglect of that which is prac-
tically indifferent and immaterial constitutes in strict logic a fiction. WeThe Legal Nature of the Corporations/59
treat many as one, because individual differences are for the moment
immaterial. We say that A B C D .... N O P Q R enter into a legal
relation with R. instead of excluding R from the party of the first part,
because the difference between A .... Q and A .... R is minimal and may
be practically ignored, especially as this practical neglect corresponds
with actual adjustments of control and possession, and greatly facili-
tates the operation of legal rules. We say that A .... Q are the same as B
.... R. because the loss of A and the accession of R are insignificant in
view of the continuing nexus operating now and then upon B .... Q. In
all these cases we indulge strictly speaking in a fiction, but such fictions
based upon the neglect of the irrelevant are very different from fictions
which mean the substitution of an imaginary conception for a substan-
tial nonentity.
§44. Imperfections of Corporate Unity. The relative natureof corpo-
rate unity may present difficulties which are foreign to individual per-
sonality. Cases may arise in which the elements that produce the im-
pression of unity, identity, and distinctiveness, become vague and doubt-
ful, notwithstanding the outward semblance of corporate existence. There
will then be a conflict between technical form and substantial defect, in
which the maintenance of the form may give rise to actual fictions.
The idea of identity in succession rests upon the fact, that where the
continuity of association is preserved, a change in membership is actu-
ally immaterial. This view becomes unreal, where a sudden and radical
change in membership takes place. Suppose that the legislature grants a
franchise to a body of designated persons and their successors. The
grant of the franchise is supposed to have been induced by special con-
fidence reposed in the grantees and is therefore untransferable, yet in
form it is to the body corporate. If then the original corporators at once
transfer their interests to others as successors in the same body, the
legislative intent is undoubtedly evaded, while a gradual change of mem-
bership in course of time must have been contemplated. We have seen
before that the same persons may in good faith constitute two different
corporations, if the nexus of association is sufficiently distinct; but a
separate incorporation does not constitute actual differentiation, where
the connecting bond remains substantially the same. Attempts have been
made repeatedly to rid insolvent municipalities of their obligations by
legislating them out of existence, and creating out of substantially the
same territory and people a new and distinct corporation. But the United
States Supreme Court has insisted upon treating the new corporation as60/Ernst Freund
the successor of the old, which was equivalent to the recognition of their
substantial identity.61 If a firm of partners in selling the good will of
their business should covenant not to engage in the same business for a
term of years, would they be allowed to evade this covenant by organiz-
ing themselves into a corporation and claiming the benefit of its distinc-
tive existence? Where a corporation was organized to hinder and delay
creditors, it was held that they might disregard the corporation as a void
thing, and that fraud will vitiate incorporation as well as other instru-
ments.62
At what point the distinctiveness of the corporation from its mem-
bers begins or ceases to be a fiction, depends upon the particular cir-
cumstances of each case. In close cases the technical aspect may easily
prevail. An English act relating to the registration of vessels provided,
that no foreigner should be entitled to be owner, in whole or in part,
directly or indirectly, of any vessel required to be registered under the
act. The authorities refused to register a vessel owned by a British com-
pany, because some of the shareholders were foreigners. It was held that
the vessel was entitled to registration.63 The decision might very well
have fallen otherwise, for the provision as to indirect owning seems to
require the disregard of technical title. It was admitted that the purposes
of the statute might be frustrated by the incorporation of foreigners as a
British company, but this was declared to be casus omissus, requiring
remedial legislation. Perhaps the practical difficulties of inquiring into
the nationality of each shareholder in a large company may have influ-
enced the court. The doctrine of the Federal courts regarding the citizen-
ship of corporations was ostensibly based upon similar difficulties. But
it is clear that in all such cases the extreme insistence upon the distinc-
tiveness of the body corporate from its members may work inconve-
nience, injustice, and, in general, legal results which are contrary to the
actual state of things.64
§45. Corporation and Person.—Whether, under all the circumstances,
we shall call the corporation a person, is evidently a matter of discre-
tion. If we do, we must bear in mind that in important attributes this
personality differs from that of an individual. The corporate “person”
may have its distinct consciousness, and certainly has its distinct repu-
tation; it may therefore, like an individual, suffer from libel and slander,
but having no distinct physical body, it can suffer neither assault and
battery, nor imprisonment. In view of the many differences, nothing can
be gained by a dispute whether the corporate personality is “real,” i.e.,The Legal Nature of the Corporations/61
of the same kind as that of an individual, or not. The practical question
whether a corporation shall be included under “persons” depends upon
different considerations.
When we speak of a corporation, as a rule we do not think primarily
of a number of individuals, but rather abstractly of a human agency
devoted to distinct purposes pursued under certain definite conditions.
The corporation represents to us a social and economic factor which
may come in conflict with any other social and economic factor; in other
words, the element of distinctiveness and consequently of differentia-
tion is present to our mind. On the other hand, when we speak of a
person, what we think of is the individual in the totality of his existence.
Personality in the common acceptation of the term is equivalent to indi-
viduality, and hence excludes the idea of differentiation. We may recog-
nize that some one feels and acts differently in his official and in his
private capacity, but without straining language, we do not say that this
some one constitutes two different persons. We commonly ascribe to a
corporation will, intent, sentiment, and action, but we probably never
speak of it as a person.
Yet it does not follow that the term “person” must never be con-
strued as including corporations. The contrary is rather true. When a
statute speaks of persons, it may refer, not to individuals as such, but
simply to holders of rights. Every person is simply equivalent to every
one, i.e., every party to a relation; and if we once admit that corpora-
tions constitute distinctive parties to legal relations, we must construe
the statute so as to include them. And even where person means indi-
vidual, a corporation may indirectly be within the scope of the legisla-
tive provision, as a collection of individuals, each enjoying indirectly
the benefit or bearing the burden of corporate rights and obligations.
While therefore constitutional bills of rights, in accordance with the
development of private liberty and property as against the state, are
designed primarily for the benefit of individuals, yet corporations may
be substantially within the range of their protection, in so far as the
violation of corporate rights would impair the beneficial interests of the
members secured through corporate organization. The presumption
should therefore be that persons include corporations and such is the
accepted doctrine.
§46. Value of the Corporate Conception.—The conception of corpo-
rate unity has grown out of practical requirements and may therefore be
supposed to serve practical purposes. Its chief value is, that it enables62/Ernst Freund
us at once to determine the incidence of the effects of legal acts done in
the corporate name. We distinguish things and persons in law, because
each thing may be the subject-matter of separate legal disposition, be-
cause the act of each person normally entails consequences affecting his
person and his rights only. The distinction may be disregarded where its
reason fails. If the connection of persons or of things is so strong that
what affects one, affects all alike, we designate them by one name ex-
pressive of this unity, and the common name indicates in its turn how far
the effects of certain acts extend. The consequences of an act may fol-
low a certain nexus or bond of association rather than definite persons,
and may accordingly at different times fall on different individuals: in
that case the common name will both indicate and cover outwardly this
shifting incidence. We then speak of identity in succession, because the
most important element of identity in law is the coincidence of act and
effect. The common name thus expresses the peculiar operation of the
personal nexus and reflects the conception of unity in our mind. By the
aid of the common name, also, the corporate rights appear more like the
rights of an individual, and fancied difficulties disappear. Those who
believe that all rights must be exercised like individual rights, regard it
as anomalous that the rights of A B C D .... N P Q R should be exer-
cised by acts in which P Q R refuse to join; but designate A .... R as X
and it does not seem so strange that X should act independently of P Q
R. The same is true as to relations between the association and one of its
members (A to X instead of A to A .... R) and the identity in succession
of changing members (X = X instead of A .... Q = B ... R). Born as these
difficulties are of technical prejudices, and of the belief in the absolute
value of abstract notions, they are easily overcome by the aid of techni-
cal expedients. The treatment of a corporation as a distinctive legal
person is thus in one aspect an instrument of legal reasoning, a dialecti-
cal device. The fiction theory assumes that it is nothing but this, and
ignores the relative psychological unity, which gives reality to the con-
ception, and which is necessary to explain the collective attributes of the
body corporate. The organic theory makes this relative psychological
unity absolute, and thus carries into the law an unknown and hypotheti-
cal metaphysical quantity. Under the representation theory here submit-
ted the idea of the corporation logically follows from the operation of
the bond of association upon those subject to it, from the protection of
undivided control, from the principle of representation and the conse-
quent qualified inherence of rights and obligations in the associatesThe Legal Nature of the Corporations/63
Without having recourse to a fictitious entity, this theory leads to the
recognition of the essential qualities of unity, distinctiveness, and iden-
tity in succession, and thus satisfies the demands of technical jurispru-
dence. By showing the influence of association and representation upon
individual status, action, and liability, it also gives due weight to the
moral factor in corporate existence, which the organic theory unduly
strains, and which the fiction theory entirely ignores.
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